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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The protection of security information in government departments requires the active 
engagement of executive management to assess emerging threats and provide 
strong security risk control measures. For most government departments, 
establishing effective protection of security information is a major initiative, given the 
often continuous, strategic nature of typical security efforts. This requires 
commitments or support from senior management and adequate resources. It 
necessitates the elevation of information security management to positions of 
authority commensurate to the required responsibilities. This has been the trend in 
recent years as government departments are increasingly dependent on their 
information assets and resources, while threats and disruptions continue to escalate 
in frequency and cost. It is clear from numerous recent studies that organisations 
that have taken the steps described in this research document and have 
implemented effective information security risk control measures have achieved 
significant results in reduced losses and improved resource management. Given the 
demonstrable benefits, it is surprising that there have not been greater progress in 
effectively managing information assets. Although regulatory compliance has been a 
major driver in improving the protection of security information overall, this study has 
also shown that nearly half of all government departments are failing to initiate 
meaningful compliance efforts. Failure to address the identified vulnerabilities by 
government departments will result in espionage, covert influencing manipulation, 
fraud, sabotage and corruption. Information security risk control measures include 
the elements required to provide senior management assurance that its direction and 
intent are reflected in the security posture of the organisation by utilising a structured 
approach to implement an information security programme. Once those elements 
are in place, senior management can be confident that adequate and effective 
protection of security information will protect, as far as possible, the department’s 
vital information assets. 
 
Key Terms: 
Government department, Information, Information Security, Protective Security, 
Security. 
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CHAPTER 1
 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Information, in all its different forms, has become vital strategic asset, indispensable 
to performing any business or providing any service. Information is the foundation 
upon which all systems in government departments operate in South Africa and any 
other country. According to Buchalter (2004:2), departments and agencies must 
place greater emphasis on the protection of security information that could expose 
the nation’s critical infrastructure, military, government, and citizenry to an increased 
risk of attack. Departments should carefully consider the sensitivity of any 
information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause national 
security harm.  According to Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) 
cabinet document (1998), the state has valuable information that needs to be 
entrusted to people in order to get the work done. Therefore, the security and 
management of state information is important for government departments. 
Government departments are investing heavily in information security, and yet there 
are still data breaches occurring on a daily basis (South Africa 1998).  
According to the South African Official Information Act No. 156 of 1982, Section 1(2), 
official information should be protected to preserve personal privacy and government 
interest. Different legislations, policies and security measures pertaining to 
information security that has been implemented in South Africa and internationally, 
has been studied for this research (South Africa 1982). According to Brotby (2008:7), 
information security is not only a technical issue, but a business and governance 
challenge that involves risk management, reporting and accountability. Moreover, 
effective security requires the active engagement of executive management to 
assess emerging threats and provide strong cyber security leadership. The term 
penned to describe executive management’s engagement is corporate governance. 
Corporate governance consists of the set of policies and internal controls by which 
organisations, irrespective of size or form, are directed and managed. Information 
security governance is a subset of an organisation’s overall governance programme. 
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Risk management, reporting and accountability are central features of these policies 
and internal controls. 
According to Brotby (2008:7), information security takes the larger view that the 
information and the knowledge based on it must be adequately protected regardless 
of how it is handled, processed, transported or stored. Information security 
addresses the universe of risks, benefits and processes involved with all information 
resources. It has become clear that information must be treated with the same care 
and prudence as are other critical organisational resources.  
The aim of this study is to evaluate the security measures that are currently used for 
the protection of security information by South African government departments and 
the identification of vulnerabilities and risks that may lead to threats.  
 
1.2. THE RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
On December 4, 1998, the South African Government approved the MISS document 
as national information security policy. The MISS was compiled as the official 
government policy document on information security. The document must be 
maintained by all government institutions that handle sensitive or classified 
information of the state. The MISS documents lays down minimum standard for the 
handling of classified information, which must be implemented by government 
departments (South Africa 1998). 
During the past years, various presidents in the United States of America (USA) 
implemented different strategies for the protection of information. They all tried to 
establish a different approach for the protection of information. Policies and 
directives were formulated for the protection of information. Although several policies 
were formulated regarding the safeguarding and protection of security information, 
there are still vulnerabilities, risks and new threats emerging all the time. This 
problem may be resolved only if security risk assessments are conducted on a 
continuous basis (Buchalter 2004:1-5). 
According to Schweitzer (1996:13), many security managers and system managers 
assume they know how to establish an information security programme. It is 
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unfortunate that most security managers have failed to establish information security 
programme correctly. The following case illustrates the point:  
“the information systems vice president of a large company decided that 
information was at risk. A member of the information system staff, with help 
from others, initiated an information protection programme. After a 
considerable effort that lasted about two years, the company auditors reported 
that other staff groups and the operating units were not following the security 
requirements, which they regarded as a systems matter” (Schweitzer 
1996:13). 
Information is the only intangible asset and is the most difficult to secure. From a 
strategic point of view, the form of information (written, electronic, and mental) 
should make a little difference in security investment decision. Loss of information by 
government departments may results with huge impact on their service delivery. At 
minimum, the company should know which elements of information are critical to 
business success and should make carefully considered strategic decisions for 
protecting information. Information protection is a complex and difficult issue that 
cannot be dealt with in a cursory manner (Schweitzer 1996:170). 
Security measures that have to be implemented for the protection of information 
within government institutions should generally be as extensive as the value of the 
information to be protected. Government institutions should know the nature and 
extent of the risks facing the protection of security information before implementing 
any security measures (Lombard 2002: 10). 
On 18 November 2012, Sunday Times revealed that there were about 300 pages of 
leaked documents on President Zuma’s corruption case. This is revealed in more 
than 300 pages of explosive internal electronic mails, memorandums and minutes of 
meetings leaked to Sunday Times. The question is: How was this information leaked 
from the president’s office (Sunday Times 2012:1)? The Protection of Information Act 
No. 84 of 1982, Section 36 (1) provides for the protection from disclosure of certain 
information, prohibition of obtaining and disclosure of certain information. Any person 
who discloses government information for personal gain shall be guilty of an offence 
(South Africa1982). 
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According to Chikane (2013:10), most of the information the government has can be 
accessed by the public. Some of the government information is considered 
confidential and cannot be disclosed to third parties who have no rights to access it. 
Confidentiality in this arena builds trust and opens doors to the sharing of more 
confidential information (Chikane 2013:10). 
 
1.3. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In this study, the problem is the protection of security information in government 
departments in South Africa. Government departments are confronted with many 
security breaches that occur regularly whereby computers, discs and other forms of 
security information containing classified or sensitive information are stolen all the 
time. The main purpose of stealing security information is to acquire government 
information for personal use. Present days’ security measures give rise to the 
leakage of information, exploitation and espionage (Foster 2012:2). 
 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In response to the research problem, the study intends to find answers to the 
following research questions: 
• What type of security risk control measures are in existence for the protection 
of security information in government departments? 
• What security risks are associated with the protection of security information 
in government departments? 
• Which type of security risk control measures may be put in place for the 
protection of security information in government departments? 
 
1.5. RESEARCH GOAL 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the existing security measures at government 
departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with the protection of 
information, so that appropriate security risk control measures may be recommended 
to mitigate the threats. 
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1.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
To achieve the goal, the study will pursue the following objectives: 
• Conduct a security survey of the existing security risk control measures used 
for the protection of security information in government departments; 
• Assess the risks associated with the protection of security information in 
government departments; and 
• Identify security risk control measures for the protection of security information 
in government departments. 
 
1.7. KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS  
 
Classified information: 
According to “MISS” cabinet document, (1998), classified information refers to a 
sensitive information which, in the national interest, is held by, is produced in, or is 
under the control of the state or which concerns the state and which must by reasons 
of its sensitive nature, be exempted from disclosure and must enjoy protection 
against compromise (South Africa 1998). 
 
Government departments: 
Government department refers to all state institutions that provide their services in 
terms of Public Service regulation. These are specialised areas whereby groups of 
people control and make decisions for a country or state. These are referred to as 
areas of special expertise (Urdang 1995:153). 
 
Information: 
Information is referred to as any recorded or displayed data or knowledge or content 
of communication, regardless of its format. Information is defined as the data that 
has been analysed and synthesized (Van der Westhuizen, Schellnach-Kelly & Geyer 
2010:10). 
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Information security:  
According to the “MISS” cabinet document (1998), information security refers to a 
condition created by the conscious provision and application of documents, 
personnel, physical, computer and communication security measures to protect 
sensitive information (South Africa 1998). 
Information security is also referred to as the methods, procedures, and processes 
necessary to prevent unauthorised disclosure, modification, or destruction of 
information, or the loss of proprietary rights thereto. Information security applies to all 
information forms: paper, microforms, photographs, transparencies, magnetic 
(electronic), and human memory (Schweitzer 1996:7). 
 
Information Security Risk Assessment: 
Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) is referred to as the business process 
of identifying potential threats, vulnerabilities, impact and risks to the organisation 
and the likelihood of their occurrence. Results can be expressed in qualitative or 
quantitative terms or a combination of both. Information Security Risk Assessment is 
one component of risk management (Layton 2007:7). 
 
Protective Security:  
According to the “MISS” cabinet document (1998), protective security is a much 
narrower concept than National Security, although very much a part/element of the 
latter. This concept deals with the provisioning and maintaining of measures to 
protect lives, property and information and as such could include: vetting, security 
investigations, guarding, document, personnel, physical and Information Technology 
security (South Africa, 1998). 
 
Security: 
Security is defined as the implementation of cost-effective security measures that, 
when taken as a whole, have the effect of reducing the probability of loss-incurring 
events or reducing the impact of any loss-incurring events that occurs (Rogers 2005: 
105). 
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Security Risk Control Measures: 
Security Risk Control Measures (SRCM) refer to all the security measures that must 
be implemented to prevent, restrict and recover security-related losses. These 
control measures may take the following forms: human security; technical security; 
security procedures; security policy; and security aids (Rogers 2005: 215). 
 
Security survey: 
Security survey may be defined as a comprehensive critical on-site inspection of 
current security measures that are in place in an organisation, company or business 
in order to identify and rectify security weaknesses or excessive security measures 
(Rogers 2005: 57). 
 
Threats:  
Threats may be defined as any potential event or act, deliberate or accidental that 
could cause impact to employees or assets (Mulder 2006:27). Furthermore, Layton 
(2007:7) defines threat as the potential for a threat to be exercised, either 
accidentally or intentionally, for the purpose of exploiting a specific vulnerability. 
 
Vulnerability: 
Vulnerability means that security measures are inadequate. For example, an asset 
such as cash may be exposed to a security risk like robbery. Vulnerability implies a 
lack of security measures in relation to security risk (Rogers 2005: 109).  
 
1.8. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The outline of this dissertation is organised into five chapters.  
 
Chapter One discusses the general orientation for the study by presenting the 
rationale for research, research problem, research questions, research goal, 
research objectives and key theoretical concepts.  
 
Chapter Two of this study is a discussion of the research methodology that includes 
the research approach and research design. The chapter provides a discussion of 
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the population and sample of the study, an explanation of how the data were 
collected and how the data were analysed and presented. This chapter also 
addresses reliability and validity, limitations to the study, value of the study and 
ethical considerations.  
 
Chapter Three refers to literature study on the protection of security information 
within government departments in South Africa. In this chapter, the researcher 
provides a conceptual analysis for the protection of security information within 
government departments. This chapter also addresses MISS, security risk 
assessments, information security programmes, Strategic decision making, Security 
risk control measures and disclosure of security information. 
 
Chapter Four discusses how the data were collected, analysed and interpreted to 
draw conclusion. This chapter will also address all questions that are in the 
questionnaire for Security Information Managers. Tables shall be used to illustrate 
the research results. 
  
Chapter Five presents the research findings and recommendations and drawn from 
the research results.  
 
1.9. CONCLUSION 
Information security takes the larger view that the information and the knowledge 
based on it must be adequately protected regardless of how it is handled, processed, 
transported or stored. Information security addresses the universe of risks, benefits 
and processes involved with all information resources. It has become clear that 
information must be treated with the same care and prudence as are other critical 
organisational resources. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research methodology used in this study, namely; the 
research approach, research design, population and sampling, data collection 
methods and instruments and analysis of the data. Five government departments 
were randomly selected from each province, using the random sampling technique. 
In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with sampled participants 
using an interview schedule that consisted of open-ended questions. A semi-
structured observation was conducted using a checklist. In addition, a semi-
structured documentary study was done on all relevant documents to the study using 
a checklist. The focus was mainly government department sites, documents 
pertaining to the protection of security information and Information Security 
Managers who dealt with the protection of security information in their respective 
departments. Content analysis was done using categories and themes as a 
technique to qualitatively analyse the data. Factors such as ethical considerations, 
limitations to the study, validity and reliability of information and the value of this 
study will also be discussed.  
 
2.2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
Qualitative research approach was used in this study because it is concerned with 
how the social world is interpreted, understood and experienced. Furthermore, it is 
based on generated data which is flexible and sensitive to the social context in which 
the data are obtained (Mason 1996:4).  
 
2.3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
Mistry, Minnaar, Patel and Rustin (2003:60), citing Huysamen, define a research 
design as the plan or blueprint according to which data are to be collected to 
investigate the research hypothesis or question in the most economical manner. 
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Accordingly, the researcher used a case study design that helped him to understand 
the uniqueness and the characteristics of Information Security Managers within 
government departments (Fouchê & Delport 2011:101-112). In designing his 
research, the researcher started his plan by randomly selecting government 
departments in each province. Secondly, he planned to conduct interviews with 
Information Security Managers within the selected government departments because 
they dealt with the protection of information within government departments. An 
open-ended interview schedule was developed to guide the collection of data from 
Information Security Managers. The aim was to conduct face-to-face interviews with 
Information Security Managers using this interview schedule in order to obtain 
information on the security measures used for the protection of security information. 
Permission letters to conduct the study as well as interviews were forwarded to the 
relevant government departments. The researcher developed an observation 
checklist that was used to obtain information during observations that were 
conducted at government registries. A documentary checklist was also developed 
and used to obtain information for this study. The researcher studied the protection 
of security information in government departments within the theoretical framework 
of the MISS document. The focus was to test the application of the MISS document 
and the Protection of Information Act, 1982 (Act no 84 of 1982) and more especially 
critically testing the present practices, to enhance the protection of security 
information within government departments. 
 
2.4. POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
Probability and non-probability sampling was used in this study. According to 
Strydom and Delport (2011:390), in non-probability sampling the odds of selecting a 
particular individual are not known because the researcher does not know the 
population size or the number of the population. Conversely, in probability sampling, 
all units of analysis have an equal chance of being selected into the study. It was 
important for the researcher to create the opportunity for variables to be inclusive in 
the study in order to avoid some imbalances. The simple random sampling technique 
was used to randomly select five government departments in each province out of 
six (6) government departments (targeted population) that fell under Justice, Crime 
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Prevention and Security Cluster. This was done by placing them in nine bags 
according to provinces and randomly selected five (5) government departments per 
province). Those five departments are as follows: Home Affairs, Justice and 
Constitutional Services, State Security Agency, Correctional Services and the South 
African Police Service. According to Mistry et al (2003:111), purposive sampling 
involves using experts to select samples for a specific purpose. The researcher used 
purposive sampling to identify and purposively interview specialists, experts and 
officials with experience in the protection of security information. The strategy was to 
interview the identified Information Security Managers systematically until a number 
of one hundred (100) participants was reached.  
 
After selecting the population and the sample group, the researcher made 
appointments with relevant heads of government departments and arranged 
interviews with the sample group. The researcher undertook a fieldwork by visiting 
the selected government departments to conduct one-on-one interviews. Only 
Information Security Managers were the targeted group for this study because they 
managed the protection of security information in their respective departments. 
These Information Security Managers were interviewed in groups in order for the 
researcher to collect data pertaining to the protection of security information.  
 
In terms of documentary study, the researcher accessed different sources of 
information in order to have a better understanding and knowledge on the protection 
of security information in government departments in South Africa. Documents such 
as policies and procedures, security manuals, security posters, departmental 
newsletters and strategic plan documents were requested and perused in order to 
check the existence of security measures applied in the protection of security 
information. According to Strydom and Delport (2011:376), if these documents are 
studied and analysed for the purpose of scientific research, the method of 
documentary as a data collection method will become operative. Most importantly, 
sources such as security policy and procedures that were found in government 
departments helped the researcher to obtain more information that guided the study 
on the protection of security information. 
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The researcher conducted observations in all registries at the five governments 
departments that were randomly selected in each province. The researcher’s 
observations were concentrated on the following Physical Protection Systems: 
• To check if classified documents that were not in use were locked in the 
appropriate safe storage facilities such as normal filing cabinet, reinforced 
filing cabinet, safe or walk-in safe and strong room; 
• To check whether the doors of registry offices in which classified documents 
were kept were fitted with security locks; 
• To determine if there was proper control over movement within the registries 
in which classified information was handled; 
• To check whether there was identification of visitors, the issue of visitor’s 
cards or temporary permits and the escorting of visitors; 
• To check if there were appropriate registers for incoming and outgoing 
classified documents; and 
• To check if there was effective access control to restricted areas such as 
cryptographic, sever room and computer centres. 
All the above-mentioned Physical Protection Systems were observed in order to 
monitor compliance in terms of the MISS.  
 
2.5. DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS 
The researcher used an interview schedule, documentary study checklist and 
observation checklist as instruments for data collection.  
2.5.1. Design and development of data collection instruments 
The researcher designed and developed an interview schedule for semi-structured 
interviews that consists of 42 open-ended questions. These questions where 
documented in a sequence and developed in such a way that they did not go beyond 
the estimated time of the interview. The researcher prepared a handful of main 
questions with which to begin and guided the conversation. Research questions 
were tested and reviewed accordingly during the pilot study with a small group of 
participants from the intended test population. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted using this interview schedule in order to collect information from 
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Information Security Managers who were regarded as experts in the field of security 
information. During the interview, the researcher managed to probe on some of the 
main questions. When the responses lacked sufficient details, depth or clarity, the 
researcher managed to clarify the answers.  
The following main questions were used to collection data: 
• What type of security risk control measures are in existence for the protection 
of security information in government department?  
• What security risks are associated with the protection of security information 
in government department?  
•  Which type of security risk control measures may be put in place for the 
protection of security information in government department? 
The follow-up questions were asked in pursuing the implication of answers to the 
main questions. The researcher developed questions in a language that the 
respondents understood (Greef 2011: 341 – 375). The data collected through 
this interview schedule helped the researcher to make findings and 
recommendations. An observations checklist was also developed in the form of 
variables that assisted the researcher to obtain information on the existing 
Physical Protection Systems. The Physical Protection Systems such as access 
control to registries, registers, safes, reinforced steel cabinets, strong rooms and 
visitor’s cards were observed using observation checklist. Observation checklist 
consisted of “yes” or “no” questions and the comments column. The above-
mentioned Physical Protection Systems were observed according to the MISS 
documents. The researcher developed a documentary checklist in the form of 
variables that assisted to check the existing documents such as personal 
documents, official documents, archival material and internal newsletters. 
Interview schedule is attached as Annexure A, observation checklist as 
Annexure B and the documentary checklist as Annexure C. 
 
2.5.2. COLLECTION OF DATA 
2.5.2.1. Interviews  
Appointments for interviews were arranged in advance with the heads of government 
departments. Various groups of participants (information security managers) were 
interviewed at selected government departments using one-on-one interview 
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method. Interview schedule was used to collect data. Only open-ended questions 
were asked during the interviews. A group of ten officials was sampled and 
interviewed in each province. These groups were interviewed continuously until the 
number of one hundred (100) was reached.  All participants were positive, respectful 
and helpful in responding to the asked questions. When a question was asked by the 
researcher, participants responded equally since they were given an equal 
opportunity to do so. When the responses lacked sufficient details, depth or clarity, 
the researcher has managed to clarify the answer. The researcher took notes during 
all interviews conducted. A tape recorder was also used to record all interviews. This 
tape recorder assisted the researcher to remind some of the facts that he could not 
remember or not recorded in his notes. The interviewer used semi-structured and 
open-ended questions to obtain in-depth information from the respondents. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen for this study because it was discursive, focused 
and allowed both the researcher and participants to explore much on the research 
topic. The collected data was also recorded in a field journal. The data were then 
analysed and interpreted to make findings and recommendations. Permission letters 
to conduct interviews at government departments are attached as Annexure D1 to 
D14, a copy of the informed consent letter to conduct interview as Annexure E and a 
letter where permission was granted and approved to conduct the study as Annexure 
F. 
 
2.5.2.2. Observations  
An observation checklist was developed and administered for this research. This 
checklist was used to collect data from all registries in government departments that 
were randomly selected for this study. The researcher conducted a security survey 
on the existing security measures used for the protection of security information at 
government registries by using an observation checklist. The main reason why 
observations were conducted at government registries was the flow of sensitive 
information at these areas. Most government files were handled and stored at 
registries. Observations assisted the researcher to determine if there was 
compliance by government departments with security legislations such as the MISS 
documents and other relevant legislations. The notes of all data collected through 
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observations was compiled and recorded in a field journal. The data were then 
analysed and interpreted to make findings and recommendations.   
 
2.5.2.3. Document Study 
A documentary checklist was developed and administered for this study. This 
checklist was used by the researcher to collect data from various documents that 
were requested from selected government departments. Documentary study was 
done on the following documents: security policies and procedures, minutes of 
meetings held, internal newsletters, security manuals and posters, official 
documents, personal files, security plan and reports. All these sources of information 
were studied. Data obtained from these information sources were recorded in a field 
journal. According to Strydom and Delport (2011:376), if these documents are 
studied and analysed for the purposes of scientific research, the method of 
document study as a data collection method became operative. When conducting a 
documentary study, the main focus was on the protection of security information in 
government departments. Furthermore, the researcher focused on the classification 
of documents containing sensitive information such as official documents in order to 
determine if such documents were classified in terms of the MISS documents. The 
researcher took notes of all data found with regard to the classification system.  A 
documentary study contributed much in this study because the data obtained 
assisted the researcher to make findings and recommendations. 
 
2.5.2.4. Experience  
The researcher has seventeen (17) years of experience in security services. The 
protection of information security in government departments was one of the 
researcher’s responsibilities. The researcher has the necessary knowledge and skills 
relevant to the research topic and research questions. Moreover, the researcher 
worked in government departments such as Department of Agriculture, Department 
of Health and Social development, Department of Economic Development and 
Tourism, Department of Finance and currently at the Department of Labour. He 
acquired too much knowledge in security management that involves the protection of 
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security information. Therefore, the researcher has the necessary skills and 
knowledge on the Protection of Information Act and MISS document.  
 
In terms of relevant training and development, the researcher is a committed worker 
and holds various certificates programmes, including project management, electronic 
communication security, advanced archives and records management, State 
Security Agency security manager’s course, counter intelligence and information 
protection. With his experience in government sector, the researcher managed to 
gain access to various sources such as security policies and procedures, minutes of 
meetings held, internal newsletters, security manuals and posters, official 
documents, personal files, security plan and reports that were used in government 
departments. The information gained from these sources helped the researcher to 
make findings and recommendations of this study.  
 
2.5.2.5. Literature study 
Literature study was conducted using books relevant to the study, conference 
papers, journal articles, previous theses and dissertations, government publications, 
course materials, literature on internet, government policies and legislations on the 
protection of security information. The rationale and research questions served as 
guidelines in obtaining the relevant literature for the research. The literature study 
covered the security risks control measures implemented for the protection of 
security information in South Africa. There was no problem encountered by the 
researcher during literature study and as a result, the study was successfully 
completed. The information obtained during literature study helped the researcher to 
make findings and recommendations. 
 
2.5.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
Qualitative data analysis refers to the transformation of data into findings. This 
involves reducing the volume of raw information, shifting significance from trivia, 
identifying significant patterns and constructing a framework for communicating the 
essence of what the data reveal   (Schurink,  Fouché  & De Vos 2011:397). 
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This study was analysed by means of collaborative inquiry. This was done through a 
structured listing of the researcher’s interest which involves: 
• the characteristics of language as communication with regard to its content, 
process and as it mirrors culture in terms of the cognitive structure as well as 
the interactive process; 
• the discovery of regularities as the identification and categorisation of 
elements and the establishment of their connections, and as the identification 
of patterns; 
• the comprehension of the meaning of text or action through the discovery of 
themes and interpretation; and 
• reflection (Tesch 1992:77). 
 
2.5.3.1. Coding and categorising the data 
According to Tesch (1992:138), the first step in the analysis process is re-
arrangement or re-organisation of the data. Schurink, et al. (2011:423) added that 
the data should be broken into themes and units for data analysis by coding and 
categorising the data. In addition, the researcher looked at the commonalities in the 
themes identified in the data. The comparable themes were grouped together. 
However, the researcher worked with one group of themes at a time. Tesch 
(1992:138) emphasised that if the themes are grouped together, they can be said to 
be in a category. The data analysis spiral from Leedy and Ormrod (2005:151) was 
also adopted in this study. The data collected during interviews, literature, 
observation and documentary study were categorised according to the key 
theoretical concepts: 
• Security risks; 
• Security risk control measures; 
• Security practices / security principles; and 
• Solutions on the protection of security information. 
The categorisation of data was done using a filing system by opening a file for each 
key theoretical concepts, and information under each category was then filed 
chronologically. 
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2.5.3.2. Reflecting on the codes and categories. 
Tesch (1992:145) emphasised that the researcher must pay attention to the actual 
content, identify and summarise the content for each category. Furthermore, the 
researcher should look for commonalities in content, uniqueness in content, 
confusions and contradictions in content and missing information with regard to the 
research question or topic. Furthermore, information was compared with categories 
in order to identify variations and similar meanings. The data collected was 
scrutinised daily and similar data as well as variations were categorised together and 
where there was a need for information, it was easily identified, obtained and then 
categorised.   
 
2.5.3.3. Identifying themes and emerging explanations 
Tesch (1992:78) emphasised the discovery of regularities as the identification and 
categorization of elements and the establishment of connections. Furthermore, the 
identification of patterns was done and the emerging recurring themes and 
interconnections between the categories and units were identified in order to 
establish a direct and systematic approach when analysing the data. Data were 
organised into file folders and computer file. Files were then converted into 
appropriate text units or sentences and were analysed using a computer. The data 
recorded by technical media was interpreted through transcription. The cassettes or 
tapes were repeated several times so that the researcher could get a sense of what 
they contained as a whole. The researcher took his time to listen to all tapes and 
wrote important notes. Recorded information was converted into raw data. The raw 
data was then analysed and interpreted to make findings and recommendations. 
 
2.5.3.4. Develop a storyline 
Tesch (1992:141) highlighted that an organising system should be developed that 
will make meaningful grouping of data pieces possible. The researcher combined the 
following four sources from which organising system derived: the research question 
and sub-questions; the research instruments; concepts or categories used by other 
authors in previous related studies and the data themselves. According to Tesch 
(1992:142), if the study involves an instrument for data collection, such as a 
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questionnaire or interview schedule, the questions often provide handy categories 
and that adopting concepts other researchers have developed appears to be safe.  
The researcher developed an organising system and adopted other researcher’s 
concepts because it has already being applied and was workable to those 
researchers.  Furthermore, Tesch (1992:78) emphasised the comprehension of the 
meaning of text or action through the discovery of themes and through interpretation. 
After reflecting on the data, the researcher integrated and summarised the data. A 
storyline was developed that explained the themes and relationships identified in the 
data. The data were then interpreted into understandable meaning. The data were 
reduced to a small and manageable set of themes. Finally, the data were then 
analysed and interpreted to make findings and recommendations. 
 
2.5.3.5. Presenting the data 
The researcher used tables to categorise the themes: collection, analysis and 
interpretation of research data on the protection of security information within 
government departments in South Africa. The raw data that derived from the 
researcher’s written notes was analysed and presented in a table form.   
 
2.5.4. Piloting 
Barker (2003:327-328) defines a pilot study as a procedure for testing and validating 
an instrument by administering it to a small group of participants from the intended 
test population. Mistry, et al. (2003:138) added that piloting refers to the testing of 
your instruments. Before the researcher commenced with fieldwork, he ensured the 
reliability and validity of his instrument. For the instrument experimental, the 
researcher tested the instrument with a target group comprising 10 Security 
Information Managers. In addition, the researcher arranged interviews with this 
target group. 
 
In setting up these interviews, the researcher drew on respondents that match the 
profile of the sample, but who were not included when the sample was drawn. 
However, participants of pilot study were not interviewed during the main study. The 
researcher examined each completed interview schedule and assessed each and 
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every aspect of it, listed the problems and identified the questions that needed 
refining. The researcher reviewed whether the questions produced the types of 
responses he wanted. 
 
In terms of observation, the researcher has selected few government departments 
that were used as a pilot study. A security survey on the existing security measures 
used for the protection of security information was conducted using an observation 
checklist. Moreover, the checklist to check if it was suitable to be used for this study 
was evaluated. Furthermore, the researcher examined compliance with the MISS 
document. The documentary study was tested with a targeted group by studying the 
existing documents in order to check compliance with information security 
legislations. This assisted the researcher in determining whether the documentary 
study will effectively play a vital role in this study. Notably, the sample used in the 
pilot study was not used in the main research project. The researcher made the 
necessary changes to the data collection instruments before conducting the 
fieldwork.  
 
2.6. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
2.6.1. VALIDITY  
Validity refers to the truthfulness, accuracy, authenticity, genuineness and 
soundness (Delport & Roestenburg 2011:171-205). 
The researcher ensured that the data collected through the following three 
measuring instruments were valid: interviews, documentary study and observation. 
• Interviews were considered valid because the researcher interviewed experts 
(Information Security Managers who had knowledge on the protection of 
security information in government departments) with an interview schedule 
based on the research questions and purpose.  
•  The researcher ensured that the data collected during documentary study 
was valid by consulting government publications, books relevant to the study, 
conference papers, journal articles, previous theses and dissertations, course 
materials, literature on internet, government policies and legislations relevant 
to the research questions and purpose of the study.  
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• The researcher ensured that the data collected was valid by conducting 
observations at government registries in order to determine compliance by 
government departments on security legislations such as the MISS 
documents and other relevant legislations.  
The above three measuring instruments helped the researcher to measure what was 
supposed to be measured.  
 
2.6.1.1. Content validity 
The researcher tested the knowledge and skills of Information Security Managers 
through one-on-one interview in order to validate if they were really experts. The 
degree of consistency on how Information Security Managers answered the 
questions ensured content validity. The above-mentioned three data collection 
instruments assisted the researcher to test the knowledge and skills of Information 
Security Managers. With observations, documentary study and interviews, the 
researcher managed to draw on the specialised knowledge and skills of Information 
Security Managers. The three measuring instruments helped the researcher to 
measure what was supposed to be measured. Validation was confirmed by means of 
comparing the different kinds of data collected during observations and interviews in 
order to determine whether they are common or related. 
 
2.6.1.2. Face validity 
The assessment was fair to all Information Security Managers because everybody 
was given a chance to participate in the study. A good platform was created by the 
researcher so that all participants were given an equal opportunity to respond to the 
questions asked. Participants were asked the same questions as they appear in the 
schedule and questions were straight to the point. Most importantly, the researcher 
was not biased or one-sided during interviews with participants and as a result, the 
research was fair to the participants. 
 
2.6.1.3. Criterion validity 
When the researcher met each group of Information Security Managers, the same 
principle was used to group them together. The same interview schedule was used 
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when questions were asked of all the participants. The same observation and 
documentary variables were tested at all the sites (government registries). Similarly, 
the same method of clarity seeking questions was asked for a better understanding 
by the researcher. 
 
2.6.1.4. Construct validity 
The validity of the findings from the interviews was checked through personal visit to 
the sites and through the observations. The information obtained during interviews 
was valid because the researcher confirmed the availability of the security measures 
that were implemented during the time of the study. The researcher took the findings 
of the research back to the Information Security Managers being interviewed and 
they confirmed the findings so that the researcher could be sure that they are valid. 
According to Delport and Roestenburg (2011:17), construct validity implies that all of 
the items in the measurement instrument measured the same contrast and not 
something else. The same observation and documentary variables were tested at all 
the sites (government registries) and they measured what was supposed to be 
measured. The researcher requested the manual and electronic documents such as 
policies and procedures from the participants and validated the data obtained from 
the interviews and the data were found valid.  
 
2.6.2. RELIABILITY 
Information Security Managers were used as the target for this research because 
they deal with the safeguarding of information in their respective departments. The 
researcher depended more on Information Security Managers as the main sources 
of information for this study. In addition, Information Security Managers who were 
dependable, consistent, stable, trustworthy, predictable and faithful were identified. A 
semi-structured interview schedule to ensure consistency throughout the interviews 
was used. Most importantly, the researcher was helped by the interview schedule to 
produce accurate results that do not differ from interview to interview. This means 
that the same criteria for questions were used for all the Information Security 
Managers.  
 
23 
 
23 
 
 
However, the researcher did not lead the Information Security Managers 
(participants) to answer in a specific manner, thus not leading them to a specific 
direction. The manner in which participants responded to the research questions 
without hiding information, showed that they were reliable. There was consistency in 
responding to the questions. The researcher ensured consistency when relevant 
data was collected during observations and documentary study.  Data collected 
during observations and documentary study was reliable because it assisted the 
researcher to make findings and recommendations. 
 
2.7. LIMITATIONS 
The researcher managed to conduct his research successfully. However, he 
encountered a problem that was resolved amicably with Information Security 
Managers in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. With his 
experience in the government sector, the researcher managed to gain access to 
various sources such as security policies and procedures, minutes of meetings held, 
internal newsletters, security manuals and posters, official documents, personal files, 
security plan and reports that were used in government departments. The 
information gained from these sources was used to guide the research questions. 
However, permission letters to conduct interviews were produced to the heads of 
government departments. Some of Information Security Managers were concerned 
about the confidentiality of the information obtained by the researcher. Government 
departments such as Department of Justice and Constitutional Development had 
sensitive areas where they kept secret files (court files) and were concerned about 
the safety of their information. After a lengthy discussion with Information Security 
Managers on the safety of information of such departments, the researcher managed 
to gain access to their sensitive areas and interviews were conducted successfully. 
 
2.8. VALUE OF THE STUDY 
This study is of paramount importance because it has value to government 
departments, government officials, community and UNISA. A brief discussion of the 
stakeholders to benefit from this research are outlined below: 
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Value to government departments 
The findings of this study will be significant and relevant to government departments 
as it will address the issue of security breaches. The study will add value to 
knowledge, practice, policies and it will create a roadmap for implementation of such 
policies and security standards. The result of this study will be a long-term benefit to 
government departments as beneficiaries. 
 
Value to government officials  
Personnel who handle sensitive information on their daily basis will learn how 
sensitive information should be handled in government departments. 
 
Value to the community 
With the identification of appropriate security risk control measures for the protection 
of state information, information will not get into the wrong hands for illegal activities, 
causing disruption to safety and stability in society. Therefore, society will benefit 
from a safe and secure environment. 
 
Value to the academics 
Research results will be incorporated, hopefully, into the study guides of the security 
management programme at the University of South Africa (UNISA) to add value in 
the existing body of knowledge. 
 
2.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section discusses the ethical considerations in terms of UNISA Policy on 
Research Ethics (2007:11). There was a good relationship between the researcher 
and participants throughout this study. Most importantly, participants were seen as 
indispensable and worthy partners in this research. The researcher showed a great 
respect and also protected the rights and interests of participants at every stage of 
the study. As one of their rights, participants were given opportunity to choose 
whether to participate or not. Consent on a mutual beneficial arrangement was 
obtained from participants. Moreover, there was no physical discomfort that emerged 
from this research project requiring protection from the researcher. 
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Respondents were thoroughly informed beforehand about the potential impact of the 
investigation and as a result, the respondents had the opportunity to decide if they 
wish to withdraw from the investigation or not. There was no respondent identified to 
be vulnerable that the researcher could eliminate from the study. The data collected 
from participants was treated as confidential. The raw data was stored in lockable 
steel cabinets and safe so that the access could be restricted. Information stored in 
the computer was protected through passwords. No unauthorised persons had 
access to the raw data. The raw data was analysed and interpreted to make findings 
and recommendations. UNISA ethical clearance certificate attached as Annexure G. 
 
 
2.10. CONCLUSION 
Research methodology and other relevant factors such as ethical considerations, 
limitations of the study, validity and reliability of the information and the value of this 
study were discussed in this chapter. It was important for the confidentiality of 
collected data to be maintained between the researcher and the participants 
(Information Security Managers). UNISA ethical policy was followed. All Information 
Security Managers who participated in this research were not forced to do so. They 
voluntarily participated without any arguments or negative interventions. Interviews 
were conducted in a professional manner that resulted with the participants being 
happy at the end of each interview. All interviews conducted with participants were 
fruitful to the researcher. The researcher achieved his goal and objective of the study 
through the interviews, observation and documentary study as measuring 
instruments. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a need for the protection of security information in government departments. 
Most importantly, security risk control measures should be implemented and 
monitored by relevant government employees. Government departments have a 
huge responsibility to ensure that they implement legislation that governs the 
protection of security information. The MISS, Security aspects such as Security Risk 
Assessments (SRA), Information Security Programme and Security Risk Control 
Measures (SRCM) will be discussed in this chapter. The security risk control 
measures have been identified in this study and will assist the researcher to come up 
with appropriate recommendations to government departments for their 
implementation. Where information is expected from disclosure, it implies that 
security control measures must be applied in full without any exemptions. 
Exemptions are the loopholes and eventually the downfall of most organisations 
including government departments. The researcher provides a theoretical framework 
for the protection of security information within government departments.  
 
3.2. MINIMUM INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS (MISS) 
On December 4, 1998, the Government of the Republic of South Africa approved the 
“MISS” document as national information security policy. All government 
departments are compelled to comply with this document. The aim of establishing 
this policy was to ensure that the national interest of the country is protected through 
counter-intelligence measures. The “MISS” was compiled as an official government 
policy document on information security, which must be maintained by all institutions 
who handle sensitive or classified material of the Republic of South Africa (South 
Africa 1998).  
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According to Schweitzer (1996:144), government departments should implement 
relevant standards such as “MISS” as a policy guideline. Furthermore, a policy may 
stipulate that one or more standards are to be published to provide procedural 
instruction to be followed across government departments. 
The “MISS” document lays down minimum standards for the handling of classified 
information, which must be implemented by government department that entails 
classification of information. According to “MISS” Cabinet document (1998), 
government departments have at their disposal sensitive information that requires 
security measures. The degree of sensitivity determines the level of protection, 
which implies that information must be graded or classified accordingly. Every 
classification necessitates certain security measures with respect to the protection of 
sensitive information which will be known as classified information. Moreover, the 
lowest classification of information is designated as “Restricted”, which refers to the 
classification allocated to all information that may be used by unauthorised people to 
hamper activities or cause an inconvenience to the individual or government 
departments. Such information would be suitable for all general inquiries. The next 
highest classification, “Confidential”, consists of information that may be used by 
unauthorised persons to harm the objectives and functions of an individual and or 
institution.  Moving up the scale again is “Secret” information. Information with this 
designation refers to information if disclosed inappropriately, could disrupt the 
objectives and functions of an institution and or State. In other words, this could 
cause a serious damage to government departments.  
Finally, the most sensitive information is graded “Top Secret”. This refers to 
information that is available only to staff with a need to know and those government 
departments which have an appropriate authority. Information of this type, if 
disclosed to unauthorised people, would neutralise the objectives and functions of 
institutions and or State. In other words, this type of information could cause 
exceptionally grave damage to government departments. Government employees 
authorised to access documentation of Top Secret must be required to sign a 
“Declaration of Secrecy” in order to assure control over its content. According to the 
“MISS” cabinet document (1998), Declaration of Secrecy refers to an undertaking 
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given by a person who will have, has or had access to classified information that 
he/she will treat such information as secret (South Africa 1998).  
Government departments should take into consideration the accounting practices 
when classifying information. Accounting practice is defined as the system of 
procedures and controls that an accounting department uses to create and record 
business transactions. Accounting practice should ideally be extremely consistent, 
since there are a large number of business transactions that must be dealt with in 
exactly the same manner in order to produce consistently reliable financial 
statements. Auditors rely upon consistent accounting practice when examining a 
company's financial statements (Bragg (2014:1).  If accounting practices is not taken 
into consideration when classifying information, such loopholes can create serious 
weaknesses in Information Security Programme. This is one of the security control 
measures that government departments should carefully consider. Therefore, 
consideration should be given to the protection of financial data about sensitive 
matters. Such information should not be recorded openly in journals and the ledgers 
along with supply items and petty cash purchases. Sensitive projects should have 
special accounting practices designed to minimise the risk of exposing their budgets 
and expenditures to employees who perform only routine accounting tasks. 
 According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), access to classified information 
should be controlled. Access to classified information is limited to a person who has 
an appropriate security clearance or who is by way of exception authorised thereto 
by the head of the institution with due regard being paid to the need-to-know 
principle. In order for an employee to have a valid security clearance, there is a 
process of security vetting that needs to be followed. Following the literature review 
conducted in government departments, one can argue that this process is not done 
according to the “MISS” documents. The vetting of employees involves rigorous 
procedures that need to be followed that includes: screening, qualifications 
verification, background checks and in-depth vetting investigations. The screening 
process for personnel should start at the application stage, with the applicant 
completing a detailed personal history statement. This should be done before an 
applicant may be appointed in government departments in order to prevent the hiring 
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of unethical applicants who may disclose confidential information that could hamper 
activities or inconvenience government departments (South Africa 1998). 
According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), another means of protecting sensitive 
or classified information is by signing a Declaration of Secrecy before an applicant is 
appointed or during the appointing process. These declarations are intended to 
create a psychological impression on employees, reinforcing the importance of 
protecting information to which they have been entrusted. One can argue that this 
process is not fully adhered to in accordance or one hundred percent 100 % in 
government departments. These declarations are in fact legal documents and can be 
used as evidence in a legal action if an employee is found to be in violation of it 
(South Africa 1998). 
According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), all classified secret and top secret 
material must be locked away in a safe or metal cabinet which is of adequate 
strength and equipped with a security lock. It is recommended that when classified 
documents are not in use, they must be stored as follows:  
• “Restricted documents” must be stored in the normal filing cabinet; 
• “Confidential documents” must be stored in reinforced filing cabinet; 
•  “Secret documents” must be stored in strongroom or reinforced filing cabinet; 
and lastly,  
• “Top Secret documents” must be stored in strongroom, safe or walk-in safe.  
One may argue that this is not happening in government departments. Sensitive 
documents are left unattended on the tables. It is worrying that, the implementation 
of “MISS” is not done fully in government departments. Heads of government 
departments should ensure that sensitive information is stored in appropriate or 
recommended storage facilities to avoid tempering, alteration and theft (South Africa 
1998). 
Schweitzer (1996:144) is of the view that the necessary procedures must be followed 
for the protection of security information. An example is a standard that requires that 
data processing facilities be secured. Without appropriate storage facilities, 
government information will be compromised and ultimately fall into wrong hands. 
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3.3. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENTS 
Security risk assessment is the cornerstone of an effective information security 
programme. Security at its very nature starts with a basic understanding of risk. 
Virtually every information security framework is centred on understanding the risks 
to government departments and managing them to an acceptable level. According to 
Layton (2007:3), Information Security Risk Assessment is not a stand-alone process. 
It is the first step in a larger business process known as Risk Management. An 
Information Security Risk Assessment is specific to information security, and risk 
management is a larger business initiative involving many different types of risk 
assessments and other dimensions including analysis, mitigation and et cetera. 
Security Risk Assessment should have an appropriate model that is understandable 
in government departments. The model should be designed accurately to 
accommodate the requirements of government departments. In addition, Layton 
(2007:10) identified the following Information Security Risk Assessment Model 
(ISRAM) to be adopted by government departments: scope and types of 
assessment, threats, vulnerabilities, control level of effectiveness, likelihood, impact, 
risk level, recommendations, analysis and final report. The Model should be applied 
within government departments operations and environments to effectively lower 
their information security risks. In this Model, assets should be identified as part of 
the information security programme. Assets and their values should be utilised 
during the risk analysis and risk management phase to help determine the cost-
benefit relationship between the value of the assets and the cost of potential controls 
and protection. 
Jay and Hamilton (2003:260) are of the view that security measures should be based 
on an assessment of the risks involved in the processing of information. Security 
measures should include: Adopting an Information Security Policy; Taking steps to 
control physical security; Putting in place controls on access to information; 
Establishing and sustain a business continuity plan; Training a staff on security 
systems and procedures; Detecting and investigating security breach as and when 
they occur. 
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Layton (2007:12) established Physical Information Security Assessment as the 
relevant type of assessment for security information. This type of assessment can be 
used by government departments as it focused on the physical and environmental 
controls only. Furthermore, this type of assessment can be performed very quickly 
and has the possibility of yielding some very high-risk items. A very good example is 
a breakdown in physical controls that ultimately results in serious and negative 
consequences. 
Employee Assessment must be conducted to all employees who access sensitive 
information within government departments. According to Morgan and Boardman 
(2003:150), the Information Security Officer must take reasonable steps to ensure 
the reliability of any employee of the organisation who has access to classified 
information. This is recognition that inevitably classified information will be disclosed 
to staff in an organisation. Such disclosure must be limited to relevant staff on a 
need-to-know basis, since disclosure to someone who has no need to know must be 
at variance with that principle. According to Morgan and Boardman (2003:151), Risk 
Assessment must take into account the reliability of staff and that where sensitive 
information is concerned, government department should employ employees who 
are honest.    
 Morgan and Boardman (2003:148) emphasised security risk assessment as a vital 
tool to security.  Morgan and Boardman (2003:148-149) established that 
implementing security measures that involve technology is very costly. Government 
departments should ensure that they implement effective security control measures 
that will protect information from unauthorised access, accidental loss, destruction 
and the nature of data to be protected.  
Furthermore, Morgan and Boardman (2003:148) pointed out that there is a 
temptation to assume that higher security information must be synonymous with 
sensitive personal information. However, it must be admitted that other types of 
information may also be eligible for higher security. 
Morgan and Boardman (2003:150) are of the view that the security strategy of an 
organisation should among other things consider the balance to be struck between 
best practice technical developments and cost. If a technical development which is 
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otherwise best practice is to be rejected on grounds of cost, this will need to be 
recorded and recognised. The relevant section of the organisation’s security strategy 
will thus need to be based on a separate risk assessment. The strategy should 
consider for all personal information. If technical developments which can be 
considered best practice are available, government departments must accept them; 
or if they are to be rejected, their cost must be stated with a valid reasons. 
Security Risk Assessment assisted government departments to identify information 
security risks or potential threats. Axelrod (2004:11) found that there are two sides to 
security risks namely: Threats and Vulnerabilities. It is not until a threat meets a 
vulnerability that a security incident occurs. Threats will always be out there. Threats 
can be discouraged through deterrence mechanisms, such as the possibility of 
punishment or retaliation, or they can be avoided by not engaging in activities that 
are threatening. Protective and defensive measures can be installed that will inform 
prevention attacks or ward off an attack when it occurs. Vulnerabilities can be fixed 
so that an attacker penetrating defences does not penetrate and cause damage. 
Northrup (2006:142) and Axelrod (2004:11) found that the most common threats 
come from within and outside the organisation. They add that the most common 
identified threats are computer threats, computer viruses, employee abuse of the 
network and system, financial and telephone fraud. While the above incidents 
comprise about 80% of the risk, other examples of risk include penetration of the 
system, theft of information and intellectual capital, sabotage and denial of service.  
According to Axelrod (2004:11-12), threats come from both internal and external 
sources. A very good example is the internal sources (ex-employees) that use their 
opportunity because they worked in the organisation. This refers to employees who 
were fired, particularly those who worked night shifts and weekends. If the Security 
Officers have not been informed about their dismissal, they would come to the 
facility, pretend to have lost their identity card and, because they are known, the 
Security Officers on duty will allow them access to the premises. The argument is 
that if such employee’s system access has not been terminated, he or she has free 
reign of the systems and can be danger to government departments. This may lead 
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to the department not taking actions against the ex-employees as it would publicly 
disclose deficiencies in its controls.  
Furthermore, Axelrod (2004:13) pointed out that other threats are from external 
sources such as the hacker, thief, virus creator and distributor, spy and cyber 
terrorist. From a protection point of view, the source of an attack may or may not 
result in a different defence. An organisation will build defences that can meet all 
types of attacks, but this is neither physically or economically feasible. Some middle-
off-the-road approach is often taken, with everyday attacks being let down through 
regular methods, and with the more sophisticated and damaging attacks being 
addressed according to their risk and the availability of cost effective 
countermeasures. 
According to Axelrod (2004:16), it might seem reasonable to determine the level of 
security through economic risk analysis, laws and regulations which reflect the risk 
appetites of legislators and regulators, which reflect those of their constituents. 
Hence, certain threats, such as identity theft, are given greater prominence in laws 
and regulations because of the relative influence of individual voters versus 
corporate lobbies. The cost of protecting against such threats may well be much 
higher than the benefits perceived from the corporate standpoint, or even for the 
society as a whole. However, the potential for very expensive and damaging actions 
by regulators, for example, will generally favour compliance at any cost. 
Rowe (2009:92) established that the most threat to trade secret is the company’s 
own employees because they have the motive and the opportunity that outsiders 
lack. Employees usually have legal access to trade secret information by virtue of 
their employment relationship and can use that access to misappropriate trade 
secret. Rowe (2009:92) suggests that employees should disclose or sign an oath of 
secrecy for protection of State secrets. 
Prunckun (1989:24) found out that there are three major sources of threats that need 
to be taken into consideration by Security Managers. These threats are grouped into 
three levels. Level one (1) threat includes surveillance by a foreign government’s 
security or intelligence agency or surveillance by one’s own national law 
enforcement or intelligence organisations. Level two (2) threat includes surveillance 
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by State or local law enforcement or intelligence unit, an  organised criminal group, a 
foreign or domestic business competitor employing a spy for hire, a private detective 
acting on behalf of a party interested in your business’s affairs, or other professional 
fact finders: for example, an investigative journalist. The last threat is level 3 threat 
that includes non-professional surveillance, for example, an employee, a business 
competitor, or another interested individual or group acting on their own for profit or 
revenge purposes. Furthermore, a business’ threat level may change from time to 
time due to the dynamics of its operations. Therefore, its security needs will also be 
required to either escalate or abate in response to these changing conditions. 
(Prunckun 1989:24). Peltier, Peltier and Blackley (2005:25), and Reddick (2012:212) 
added that the common threats to information security are technical hardware failure, 
errors and omissions, deliberate software attacks, acts of human error or failure, 
technological obsolescence, forces of nature, deliberate acts of espionage or 
trespass, deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism, fraud and theft. Reddick 
(2012:214) found the following threats Protection Mechanisms for information 
security to be effective: media backup, virus protection software, firewall protection, 
use of passwords, employee education, security policy, information security audits, 
reporting of information security violations and lastly automatic account logoff. If 
these threats Protection Mechanisms for information security could be effectively 
implemented by government departments, threats to information security will be 
minimised or reduced (Reddick 2012:214). According to Dhillon (2011:161), involving 
different vendors or intelligent agents in the organisational software results in 
security threats. He further stated that one problem with intelligent agent technology 
lies at communication level because at the end of the day, intelligent agents are 
integrated into a legacy software systems, in which some security mechanisms 
already exist. It is difficult to forecast on how the existing security mechanisms will 
react to the introduction of intelligent agents and whether the agents will be able to 
bypass these mechanisms (Dhillon 2011:161). Schweitzer (1996:168) is of the view 
that loose talk, paper handling and attacks on computer systems are the most 
information risks identified in the study conducted in 1990 on security information 
stored in computers. It was revealed during this study that computer security is a 
subset of information security and that both should be implemented together for the 
protection of security information in government departments. 
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3.4. INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMME  
An Information Security  Programme refers to the overall combination of technical, 
operational, procedural measures and management structures implemented to 
provide for the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information based on 
business requirements and risk analysis (Brotby 2008:72). 
Government departments have a huge responsibility of implementing Information 
Security Programme. This could be achieved if information security could be an 
integral part of departmental governance and integrated into their strategies and 
operations. According to Brotby (2008:12), the strategy must be implemented 
through a comprehensive information security programme that includes well-
conceived and complete policies and standards. The information security 
programme should cover security elements such as education and training on 
information security, assessments of risks and impact analysis, classification of 
information, development and testing of plans for continuing the business in the case 
of disaster or interruption of services. 
It is critical for management to ensure that adequate resources are allocated to 
support the overall departmental Information Security Programme. In order for 
government departments to achieve effective information security governance, it is 
important to establish and maintain a framework to guide the development and 
maintenance of a comprehensive Information Security Programme This framework 
will provide the basis for the development of a cost-effective Information Security 
Programme that supports government departments’ goals. The overall objective of 
security programme should be to provide assurance that information assets are 
given a level of protection commensurate with their value or the risk their 
compromise poses to government departments. 
Solove and Schwartz (2011:69) concurred with this view and added that government 
departments should appoint Information Security Managers who will enforce security 
programmes to protect security information. In addition, Information Security 
Managers should ensure that they provide the necessary training on how classified 
documents should be stored for effective protection. They should enforce the 
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implementation of “MISS” and evaluate its effectiveness within government 
departments. 
Bennett (1992:111) emphasised that appropriate Information Security Programme 
should be implemented against unauthorised access, alteration, disclosure, 
destruction of information and against accidental loss. 
Gutwirth, Leenes, De Hert and Poullet (2012:220) highlighted that government 
departments should use audit trails to control access to sensitive information. Audit 
trails will allow logs to be kept and be used later during investigations. Furthermore, 
government departments should use confidentiality enhancing technology and 
protection against breaches, for example, through the use of patches and encryption 
devices.  
Goodbody (2003:22) recommended the following security measures for the 
protection of security information against unauthorised access, alteration, disclosure 
or destruction:  
• Ensuring that files containing sensitive information are stored in lockable steel 
filing cabinets; 
• Ensuring that files holding sensitive information are stored in a secure area 
accessible only by relevant personnel;  
• Ensuring that electronic files are password controlled;  
• Ensuring that access to that part of the business premises which houses 
personal information is password or card controlled;  
• Ensuring that where computer screens (including laptops) are located in 
public areas (such as waiting rooms, showrooms), measures are taken to 
ensure that personal information is not inadvertently disclosed to members of 
the public;  
• Drawing up an Information Handling Policy which is brought to the attention of 
all employees responsible for handling personal information;  and 
• Ensure that all staff has been adequately trained to respect and protect the 
confidentiality of personal information and are aware of the security standards 
which have been adopted”. 
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Bennett (1992:98) highlighted the following principles to be relevant for information 
security:  
• Information should be regarded as held for a specific purpose and not to be 
used, without appropriate authorisation for other purpose;  
• Access to information should be confined to those authorised to have it for the 
purpose for which it was supplied;  
• The amount of information collected and held should be the minimum 
necessary for the achievement of a specific purpose;  
• The level of security to be achieved by a system should be specific in 
advance by the user and should include precautions against the deliberate 
abuse or misuse of information; and lastly 
•  A monitoring system should be provided to facilitate the detection of any 
violation of the security system.  
Reddick (2012:210) established that information security controls can be classified 
into three categories namely: Technical Controls, Operational Controls and 
Management Controls. Technical Controls include products and processes such as 
firewalls, antivirus software, intrusion detection software and encryption. These 
controls mainly focus on protecting the organisation’s information technology and the 
information stored in these systems. Operational controls are the enforcement 
mechanisms for correcting deficiencies that various threats could exploit, backup 
systems, physical access controls and protection from environmental hazards. 
Management controls are usage policies, employees training and business continuity 
planning, which focuses on information security’s non-technical areas. Although 
these are important to know, technology alone cannot solve information security 
problems because information security is not just a technical problem; it is a social 
and organisational issue as well. 
In the New York context, Peltier et al (2005:1) pointed out that the purpose of 
information protection is to protect an organisation’s valuable resources, such as 
information, hardware, and software. Government departments will meet their 
business objectives and mission if appropriate information security measures are 
38 
 
38 
 
 
selected and implemented accordingly. Therefore, government departments need to 
protect the information essential to the successful operation of their business.  
 
Northrup (2006:142) pointed out that if information security is to be effective, it is 
critical that everyone in the organisation takes ownership of the task. It becomes 
everyone’s responsibility to ensure that information is protected and not just the task 
of a control group or security managers.  
 
Le Veque (2006:113) added that information security exists to support organisation-
wide goals, and that is subject to overall management controls to ensure the 
protection of security information. Information Security Managers have priorities and 
resources assigned to support the overall organisational mission. Information 
Security Managers should know which information must be protected, to what level 
of protection is required and the mechanisms of protecting sensitive information.  
 
3.5. STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 
According to Brotby (2008:17), executive management has a huge responsibility that 
must be undertaken at various levels of government departments to ensure the 
achievement of effective protection of security information. Implementing effective 
strategic information security objectives requires leadership and on-going support 
from executive management. It is accepted that management has an explicit 
obligation to ensure adequate protection of security information within government 
departments. As a result, management must consider that the requirements of a 
multitude of legal and regulatory rules and legal standards of due care increasingly 
require executive management focus and commitment, oversight, impetus and 
resources. Without support from executive management, Information Security 
Managers would not effectively protect government information.  
Top management should ensure that confidential information is managed properly 
within government departments. Olsen (2010:91) pointed out that all confidential 
information should be prominently denoted as such. He adds that hard copies of 
documents, drawings, diagrams, and the sort shall be marked as confidential or 
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proprietary trade secrets on each page.  He further states that items which are 
stored electronically should also openly carry appropriate designation. 
Prunckun (1989:48) specified that confidential information should have a finite life 
span. It must be realised that despite the best-engineered security plan and the 
installation of the most sophisticated countermeasure equipment, eventually 
information which is being guarded will become known to others. He goes on to 
suggest that the best way to keep information confidential is to store them in one’s 
head and not communicate them to anyone.  
 
Morgan and Boardman (2003:107) are of the view that where information is 
confidential, it may not be disclosed outside the organisation and may not be used, 
even within the  organisation, for a purpose other than that for which it was intended 
when obtained unless the individual has given consent to this, or the use is required 
by law, or is in the public interest (which is likely to be interpreted restrictively and be 
limited to, for example, the prevention of crime or immediate threats to health of 
others). In practice, it is likely that organisations handling confidential information will 
need to obtain an individual’s consent if they wish to use the information for non-core 
purposes. 
In the Canadian context, Knight, Chilcott and McNaught (2012:180), the 
organisations shall make their employees aware of the importance of maintaining the 
confidentiality of personal information. Care shall be used in the disposal or 
destruction of personal information to prevent unauthorised parties from gaining 
access to the information (Knight, Chilott and McNaught 2012:180). Though this 
study was done elsewhere, it is also applicable in the South African context that 
according to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), signing a declaration of secrecy is of 
paramount importance for the protection of sensitive or classified information (South 
Africa 1998). 
Top management should ensure that their employees are groomed in order to 
capacitate them with appropriate knowledge especially of the protection of security 
information within government departments. According to Layton (2007:7), 
information security awareness, education and training are overarching principles 
40 
 
40 
 
 
that must be implemented in every government department. There is a clear 
difference between awareness, education and training. Awareness is typically 
directed to all users and tends to focus their attention on global security principles. 
Conversely, training is much more in-depth and the message is directed at a specific 
group or audience with an expected outcome. Education is another step beyond 
training where concepts and topics are covered in depth for the purpose of 
developing new skills and altering the outcome in some way. Education answers the 
question “why” and focuses on theory and research. Education is understood to 
continue over a period of time to master the concepts and theories.  
Northrup (2006:133) discovered that accountability relative to information starts at 
top management who needs to understand security issues and move past the 
perception that it is a technical problem. He goes on to suggest that top 
management should develop information security awareness programmes that will 
make employees security conscious. Awareness is the first step towards 
accountability and making information security a component of internal controls and 
corporate governance. Government departments need to have a plan for making 
sure that all the right people understand their individual roles with respect to security. 
Senior management has to develop and create accountability and awareness by 
establishing specific guidelines, procedures, and policies that should be applied 
throughout the organisation. 
Olsen (2010:91) found that employees are unaware of what constitute intellectual 
property and that is why they cannot protect it. Therefore, he recommends that all 
staff must be sensitised to the nature of trade secrets and proprietary information 
through effective training that must take place on a regular basis. 
Goodbody (2003:93) emphasised that government departments should arrange 
appropriate training for all staff involved in the processing of information and ensure 
that staff members understand the consequences of failure to adhere to information 
security regulations.    
Raggad (210:17) ascertained that security training programmes are made available 
to employees in accordance with the security requirements of their position. There 
are a number of factors that could lead executive management to achieve more or 
41 
 
41 
 
 
have effective protection of security information in government departments. In 
addition, Brotby (2008:58) identified the following critical factors that could assist 
government departments to achieve their goals with regards to the protection of 
security information: There was awareness that a good information security 
programme took time to evolve. The corporate information security function reports 
to senior management and was responsible for executing the information security 
programme. Management and staff had a common understanding of information 
security importance, requirements, vulnerabilities and threats, and understood and 
accepted their own security responsibilities. Third-party evaluation of information 
security policy and architecture was concluded periodically. Brotby (2008:58) also 
discovered that the information security function has the means and ability to 
administer security, especially to detect records and analyse significance, and report 
and act on security incidents when they do occur, while minimising the probability of 
occurrence by applying intrusion testing and active monitoring.  
Brotby (2008:58) identified that clearly defined roles and responsibilities for risk 
management ownership and management accountability are in place. A policy is 
established to define risk limits and risk tolerance. Responsibilities and procedures 
for defining, agreeing on and funding risk management improvements exist. The 
reality checks of the information security strategy were conducted by the third party 
to increase objectivity and were repeated at appropriate times. Critical infrastructure 
components are identified and continuously monitored.  
Brotby (2008:58) identified that service level agreement (SLA) was used to raise 
awareness of and increase co-operation with suppliers relative to security and 
continuity needs. Policy enforcement was considered and decided on at the time of 
policy development. A confirmation process was in place to measure awareness. 
Applications are secured well before they are deployed. Information control policies 
are aligned with the overall strategic plans. Management endorses and commits to 
the information security and control.  
Lastly, Brotby (2008:58) discovered that there is a consistently applied policy 
development framework that guides the formulation, roll-out, understanding and 
compliance. There is awareness that, although insiders continue to be the primary 
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source of most security risks, attacks by organised crime and other information-
related legislation contribute to this. Senior management must provide support to 
ensure employees perform their duties in an ethical and secure manner. 
Management should lead by example and ensure that there is compliance on 
information security policies. 
 
3.6. SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
Security Risk Control Measures refers to all the security measures that must be 
implemented to prevent, restrict and recover security-related losses. These control 
measures may take the following forms: human security; technical security; security 
procedures; security policy; and security aids (Rogers 2005: 215). 
Tucker (1992:87) emphasised that sensitive information must be stored in a safe 
storage facility to prevent loss, unauthorised and misuse of information. This may 
include the use of encryption keys, message authentication codes and other devices 
that assist in maintaining the protection of security information. Of course, 
appropriate physical security measures must be taken to protect government 
information. 
Raggad (2010:18) identified passwords and digital certificates as security risk control 
measures for the protection of information stored in computers.  Information security 
is the protection of information resources against unauthorised access. Conceptual 
resources such as programs, data and information can be secured by requiring 
users to supply passwords and digital certificates. While passwords prove that a 
correct code has been entered, we are still unsure who the supposed user is, or in 
fact, the real person who entered the password. We can obviously employ digital 
certificates and biometric techniques to authenticate the user and control access to 
information resources but security can still be compromised because many other 
violations such as eavesdropping can take place. Furthermore, users who have been 
authenticated and admitted into the system may be dangerous. Those users may in 
fact, once admitted inside, initiate unauthorised activities or even intentionally 
perform malicious actions that could compromise the security of the system. 
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Brotby (2008:13) found the following security risk control measures to be appropriate 
for the protection of security information in government departments: physical and 
environmental security measures, background checks, user identification, 
passwords, smart cards, biometrics and intrusion detection system such as firewalls. 
These security risk control measures are necessary and should address both threats 
and vulnerabilities in a manner that reduces potential impact to a defined, accepted 
level. 
With regards to protection principle, in the Canadian context, Knight et al (2012:179) 
discovered that personal information is protected by security measures appropriate 
to the sensitivity of the information. The security risk control measures shall protect 
sensitive or classified information against loss or theft, as well as unauthorised 
access, disclosure, copying, use or modification. Government departments should 
protect sensitive information regardless of the format in which it is held. Furthermore, 
the nature of the protection will vary depending on the sensitivity of the information 
that has been collected, the amount, distribution, format of the information and the 
method of storage. More sensitive information should be protected by a higher level 
of protection (Knight, Chilott and McNaught 2012:179). 
Solove and Schwartz (2011:56) discovered that in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, the protection of security information is of paramount 
importance. Furthermore, personal information is treated as secret. Personal 
information is protected from unauthorised people unless consent is obtained from 
the owner (employee). Personal information should be prevented from misuse by 
unauthorised people. 
Edwards and Brown (2009:232) established that it is difficult for government 
departments to protect sensitive information. There are still information security 
deniers within government departments who do not want to cooperate with security 
requirements or security risk control measures. Furthermore, for government 
departments to succeed in protecting security information, they should ensure that 
they destroy redundant documents containing sensitive information as prescribed in 
the “MISS”. Moreover, all employees should sign confidentiality agreements. 
Employees handling sensitive information in government departments should 
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consider that the protection of security information is a key component of their jobs. 
Security breaches should be prevented at all times. Employees should ensure that 
such security breaches are reported to the Security Manager. Key individuals should 
be designated to investigate reports of security breaches and incident response.  
Access control in government departments is of paramount importance. Schweitzer 
(1996:181) defined access control as control of physical entry to a facility or object. 
Furthermore, access control to sensitive information required three-step process 
such as authorisation, identification, and authentication. Access control may refer to 
the approval required for an authorised person to pass information to another 
authorised person. For electronic form of information, control of access to 
information is accomplished through computer account management and the setting 
of controls on accounts or files. Such controls might provide for any of a number of 
options, such as world read, general access, private access, and authorisation list.  
Layton (2007:74) stated that access control should be done to prevent unauthorised 
entry to valuable information and that organisations should monitor access to 
operating system, network services and information systems. 
Prunckun (1989:29) and Olsen (2010:92) established that access to business’ offices 
should be limited to employees and visitors who are known or have appointments. 
Although many organisations need a free flow of personnel and information 
throughout their facilities, those areas that contain the most sensitive information, 
documents and systems need greater protection. All other visitors should be 
carefully screened and their identities verified prior to entry. Access to offices should 
be on a restricted basis and need-to-be-there basis. If a business visitor or staff 
traffic is heavy, a system of custom-designed identity cards worn on employee’s 
outer clothing can be an effective method of quickly establishing colleagues. Toilets 
and other isolated places should be checked at the end of the day’s business for 
possible intruders hiding in the building. 
Communication Systems within government departments need to be protected for 
interception. Olsen (2010:97), Quigley (2005:202) and Prunckun (1989:36) realised 
that e-mail or other electronic communication of confidential information should be 
encrypted to prevent unauthorised reading of such information. Encryption units offer 
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an extremely high degree of security and are being able to randomly select from 
encryption codes. An example of these is when an agent was successful in 
intercepting and recording a scrambled message. Such an agent would need the 
services of a mainframe computer and perhaps months, or even years, of around-
the-clock computing time in order to decipher the message. Facilities to do these are 
realistically only available to intelligence agencies of wealthy nations, and it would be 
a course of action not embarked upon unless the benefits are more important than 
the cost.  
Olsen (2010:97) added that encryption technology can prevent someone from 
reading your organisation’s communication of confidential information or documents.  
Rosenberg and Mateos (2011:218) revealed that keeping communication secret is 
the heart of security. He indicated that the science of keeping messages secret is 
called “cryptography”. The key used in cryptography is almost unique because like 
door locks, there is no absolute certainty that two keys are unique. But the chances 
of two keys being the same are limited. However, it is not easy for an employee to 
open another colleague’s lock if a cryptography key is used to lock the office door. 
Olsen (2010:92) pointed out that Security Screening and Background Checks should 
be used as security risk control measures in government departments to ensure that 
appointed officials are security competent. Background investigations must be 
conducted on all employees who have access to sensitive information. Furthermore, 
employment history and educational history should be verified on all employees.  
Furthermore, Olsen (2010:92) found out that temporary employees are given access 
to sensitive information without signing confidential agreements. As a result, he 
suggests that background checks should be conducted on them.  
Raggad (2010:17) pointed out that screening and background checks of candidates 
have to be conducted very thoroughly to make sure that candidates with a history of 
poor behaviour cannot infiltrate into the system. The stringency of the security 
clearance associated with a position depends on the sensitivity of information 
accessible to this position.  
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In the Canadian context, Knight et al (2012:158) emphasised that sensitive 
information should be protected by a higher level of protection and that the methods 
of protection of security information should include physical security risk control 
measures such as locked filing cabinets and restricted access to offices. Secondly, 
organisational measures, for example, security clearances and limiting access on a 
“need-to-know” basis. Lastly, technological measures, for example, the use of 
passwords and encryption (Knight, Chilott and McNaught 2012:158). Though this 
study was done elsewhere, it is also applicable in the South African context in that 
the same physical security risk control measures should be implemented in terms of 
the MISS document (South Africa 1998). 
Bennett (1992:110) is of the view that government information should be protected 
by reasonable security protection against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, 
destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. The following security risk control 
measures were highlighted: Physical security measures (for example, locked doors 
and ID cards):  organisational security measures (for example, clearances for 
access) and informational security measures (for example, encryption).  
Solove and Schwartz (2011:56) supported this view and added that any organisation 
creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of identified personal data must 
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take reasonable 
security risk control measures to prevent misuse of the data.  
Government information needs to be stored in the recommended secure storage 
facilities. Tucker (1992:87) indicated that storage facility is very important for the 
storage of classified documents or sensitive information. Government employees 
must ensure that security measures which are appropriate for the storage of 
classified information are taken to prevent loss, unauthorised access, use, 
modification or disclosure or other misuse of information. In addition, where an 
employee is required to pass on the information to a third person, then all reasonable 
measures must be taken to prevent unauthorised use or disclosure of that 
information. This may include the use of strong rooms, encryption keys, message 
authentication codes and other devices which assist in maintaining the logical 
security of computerised data.  
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Prunckun (1989:37) found that a business’ first line of defence against penetration by 
a professional espionage agent is its external barriers, that is, its doors and windows. 
Its second line of defence is the containers that house its confidential documents, for 
example, filing cabinets, index drawers, and microfiche vaults. Therefore, it is 
essential that businesses identify all documents and records that may be the target 
of a professional agent and secure these in containers that minimise the risk of their 
acquisition by unauthorised persons. 
Northrup (2006:141) argued that there is no such thing as a hundred percent (l00%) 
secure system. Hundred percent (100%) security is an illusion because to err is 
human. In any advanced security system the human factor is considered to be the 
weakest link. However, it is that security can be tightened and made more secure in 
order to provide greater assurance against the potential vulnerability resulting from 
conducting business in the age of information.  
 
3.7. DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION 
According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), signing a Declaration of Secrecy is of 
paramount importance for the protection of sensitive or classified information (South 
Africa 1998).Therefore, it is a requirement in government departments that, 
applicants should sign a Declaration of Secrecy before their appointment process. 
The argument is that this process was not done one hundred percent (100%) in 
government departments. It was found in the reviewed literature that most of 
government employees did not sign Declaration of Secrecy (South Africa 1998).  
According to Layton (2007:86), all employees should sign non-disclosure or 
confidential agreements for the protection of security information in government 
departments. This control measure is used for personnel security. In the past, many 
organisations have overlooked the need to extend their information security policies 
to business and contractual agreements. This is becoming more of a common 
practice and in some cases required because of the legal and regulatory 
requirements placed on the organisations. These declarations are in fact legal 
documents and can be used as evidence in a legal action if an employee is found to 
be in violation of. 
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Tucker (1992:3) added that no employees were allowed to disclose information to 
unauthorised persons. The only time when information could be disclosed was when 
it was demanded by law. Information Security Managers should ensure that 
information is protected at all times to prevent it against loss, destruction, 
unauthorised use, access, modification and disclosure of security information. 
Olsen (2010:92) found that confidentiality agreement is one of the most effective 
tools in raising employees’ awareness and sensitive information plays an important 
role in an organisation. If employees execute confidential agreements upon hiring 
and at least once a year, this will make them realise that protection of information is 
very important.  
Raggad (2010:17) also established that all employees who are involved in security 
matters and those who need access to sensitive information have to sign non-
disclosure agreements appropriate to their positions or prior to granting access to 
that information.  
Solove and Schwartz (2011:55) are of the view that disclosure of security information 
was prohibited according to the Protection of Information Act. Furthermore, the 
South African courts also had their responsibility to protect sensitive information by 
applying information security measures for the protection of security information. 
Court documents were sealed and information was not disclosed to the public. 
In the Canadian context, Knight et al (2012:158) supported the statement that 
government departments may enter into agreements or arrangements with their 
employees. This will assist government departments in maintaining confidential 
information without being disclosed to unauthorised people (Knight, Chilott and 
McNaught 2012:158). 
Solove and Schwartz (2011:56) stated that for security information, government 
departments must establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical 
protection to ensure the security and confidentiality of records. 
Solove and Schwartz (2011:63) recognised that disclosure of security information in 
government departments is of paramount importance. All employees employed by 
government should sign non-disclosure forms without any exceptions. This control 
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measure should be applicable to all employees including executive management 
who should lead by example. 
Government documents containing sensitive information should be classified in order 
to avoid disclosure of information to unauthorised people. Olsen (2010:89) found that 
once organisations have identified the trade secrets they own and where these 
assets reside within the organisations, they need to classify them in order of 
importance to the organisations mission. He added that those items that have been 
identified as mission critical must be afforded the utmost protection. 
Olsen (2010:89) emphasised the following four classification levels to be appropriate 
for information security:  
• Classified: This refers to the mission-critical information that is to be afforded 
the utmost protection. Such information is not to be disclosed to anyone 
outside the core group of those individuals who have been authorised to 
access it. 
•  Confidential: Here the access should be strictly limited to those employees 
who have an actual need to know.  
• Sensitive: The information is for the use of authorised employees on a 
broader organisational scale. Such information should not be disclosed to 
unauthorized employees or outsiders.  
• Unrestricted: such information contains public information or other information 
that is of little consequence to the organisation’s proprietary property. 
Solove and Schwartz (2011:62) added that classification on information should be 
applied only to records that contained sensitive information. Furthermore, all records 
that were identified as sensitive should be kept as confidential. Government 
employees are not allowed to disclose sensitive information to any person without 
authorisation from the head of institution. 
Olsen (2010:90) had a different view that no single classification scheme will be 
correct for any organisation. The needs of each government department must be 
considered and evaluated before any such scheme can be implemented. 
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3.8. CONCLUSION 
There is a need to protect sensitive information in government as it poses a risk to 
government departments as well as the country. Thus, it can be concluded that a 
decisive intervention is needed in government departments to ensure that security 
aspects such as Security Risk Control Measures, Security Assessment and 
Information Security Programs are implemented in full for the protection of security 
information. The implementation of these aspects would ensure the smooth running 
of operations to inform or render a top class service within government departments. 
The importance and emphasis of these measures must therefore be recognised.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEDUCTIONS 
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the researcher discusses how the data were collected. Data 
collection was in the form of interviews, observation and documentary study. Data 
were subsequently analysed and interpreted to make deductions. The primary data 
collected for this study was from one hundred (100) Information Security Managers 
who work in various government departments in South Africa. An interview schedule 
with 42 open-ended questions was used to obtain information on the protection of 
security information. Interviews were recorded and transcribed to facilitate efficient 
coding and analysis of the collected data. Observation and documentary study were 
conducted in government Registry Offices. The data from the interviews, observation 
and documentary study were analysed for the purpose of interpretation and making 
deductions. 
 
4.2. DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The data for this study were collected through one-on-one interviews conducted with 
security experts (Information Security Managers) who deal with the protection of 
security information on a daily basis within government departments. All interviews 
were recorded using a voice recording device. In addition, a field journal was also 
used to record the interviews in writing.  The voice recordings and field journal notes 
were compared and transcribed. The researcher visited Registry Offices to conduct 
observations and documentary studies. The visit helped the researcher to confirm 
what was said by the participants during the interviews. The collected data was then 
analysed and interpreted to make deductions. The analysed data from the interviews 
is presented hereunder in tables, with interpretations and deductions. Data from the 
observation and documentary study are qualitatively analysed and discussed with 
interpretations and deductions in the paragraphs that follow. 
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4.3. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
This section presents the analysis results on biographical information.  
4.3.1. Security Information Managers (Participants) 
4.3.1.1. Gender (See Annexure A question 1) 
Table 4.1: Gender of Participants (N=100) 
Gender of participants Frequency Percentage  
Male 61 61.0 
Female  39 39.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question about gender of the participants was designed to identify the 
representativeness of gender in terms of Information Security Managers 
(participants) within government departments. The majority of the respondents who 
participated in this study were males.  
 
Deduction: 
Male Information Security Managers are overrepresented while females are 
underrepresented in the security industry because previously females were not 
considered in the security environment. Another justification to explain the low 
number of females in security industry is that women and girls were overlooked. The 
current status of security is different. Therefore, government departments consider 
qualifications and gender equality. Appointments of all employees are done without 
discriminations. According to Mackenzie (2012:87), there is an assumption that 
women and girls were either victims caught up in the fray of a male-dominated 
conflict or were left behind by programs that likely would have benefited them in the 
same way they benefited male Security Officers. 
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4.3.1.2 Ages (See Annexure A question 2) 
Table 4.2: Ages of Participants (N=100) 
Age of participants Frequency Percentage 
Younger than 25 4 4.0 
26 - 35  21 21.0 
36 - 45 45 45.0 
Older than 46 30 30.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The study shows that the majority of respondents who participated were between 36 
to 45 years of age. 
 
Deduction: 
Previously, many people did not consider security as a career. Those who are in 
management now are those that took security as a career and that is why the 
majority of participants were between 36 - 45 years of age. It is recently whereby 
people started to consider security as a career and unfortunately to be an 
Information Security Manager, you should also have relevant experience. According 
to Frerks, Ypeij and König (2014:73), at the beginning of the twenty-first century , 
while the army finally recognised women soldiers as crucial to the military system, 
the new media campaign started to display pictures of female pilots, fighters or high 
ranking officers as the emblem of the achievements of the military reform. Today 
government departments have employed both men and women Security Officers in 
order to balance the equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
54 
 
 
4.3.1.3. Highest educational qualification (See Annexure A question 3) 
 
Table 4.3. Highest educational qualification of Participants (N=100) 
Educational qualification Frequency Percentage  
High School  28 28.0 
Undergraduate 32 32.0 
Postgraduate 40 40.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The study indicates that most of participants have postgraduate qualifications.  
 
Deduction:  
The reason for obtaining postgraduate qualifications is that participants want to 
occupy managerial positions.  
 
4.3.1.4 Employment category (See Annexure A question 4) 
 
Table 4.4 Employment category of Participants (N=100) 
Employment 
category 
Frequency Percentage 
Clerical  6 6 
Administration  17 17 
Junior Management  21 21 
Middle Management 47 47 
Top Management 9 9 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
From the data collected, most of Information Security Managers are in Middle 
Management.   
Deduction: 
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Most of Information Security Managers are in Middle Management because 
previously security was not recognised in top management. Currently security plays 
a vital role in government departments that is why Information Security Managers 
are appointed in Middle Management and few in top management. According to 
“MISS” cabinet document (1998), the head of security component must have direct 
access to the head of the institution and seat in management meetings in order to 
advice management on the protection of security information as well as security 
functional matters (South Africa 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
56 
 
 
4.3.1.5 Name of institution of participants (See Annexure A question 5) 
Table 4.5 Name of institution of Participants (N=100) 
Name of institution Frequency Percentage 
State Security Agency 8 8 
Department of Correctional services 12 12 
Department of Home Affairs 10 10 
South African Police Service 20 20 
Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 
12 12 
Department of Labour 5 5 
Department of Cooperative Governance, 
Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs 
3 3 
Special Investigating Unit 1 1 
Department of Public Works 4 4 
Department of Sports Arts and Culture 1 1 
Department of Health  5 5 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisherman 
2 2 
Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism (LEDET) 
4 4 
Department of Water Affairs  2 2 
Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform 
1 1 
Safety and Liaison 1 1 
Department of Environmental Affairs 1 1 
Department of Higher Education and Training 1 1 
Social Security 1 1 
Provincial Legislature 1 1 
Statistics South Africa 1 1 
Premier’s Office 1 1 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate 1 1 
Total  100 100.0 
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Interpretation: 
The study shows that the majority of participants were from the SAPS, Department 
of Correctional Services, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
followed by Department of Home Affairs and State Security Agency.  
 
Deduction: 
Most participants were from SAPS because the country relies more on them as they 
provide the protection services.  SAPS is of paramount importance. Thus, the SAPS 
officers should always come in a mass because should the country have less police 
officers. Otherwise, crime will not be reduced.  Institutions such as the Department of 
Correctional Services as well as the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development are used to discipline or correct people who involve themselves in 
criminal activities; thus, their representation should always be higher than other 
departments. 
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4.4. IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY RISKS 
 
4.4.1. Security risk control measures existing in government departments for 
the protection of security information (See Annexure A question 6). 
Table 4.6 The type of security risk control measures existing in government 
departments for the protection of security information (N=100)  
What type of security risk control measures are 
in existence for the protection of security 
information in government department? 
Frequency Percentage 
Technical Surveillance Counter measures 
(sweeping) 
2 2.0 
Encryption of Information Technology (IT) 
equipment 
2 2.0 
Documents containing sensitive information are 
classified according to the Minimum Information 
Security Standards (MISS) 
2 2.0 
Security vetting or  security screening and 
personnel suitability check 
9 9.0 
Access  control is done by Security Officers or 
Police Officers 
8 8.0 
Computer passwords 3 3.0 
Signing of oath of secrecy/confidentiality clause or 
agreements or sworn in oath 
2 2.0 
Lockable steel cabinets, safes, strong rooms, walk 
in safe, reinforced steel cabinets and optimizer 
15 15.0 
Directives, MISS policy, Security policy, IT policy 
and key control policy 
3 3.0 
The protection of information Act, South African 
Police Service Act, and Criminal procedures Act 
2 2.0 
Registers for incoming and outgoing sensitive 
documents  
2 2.0 
Courier services for the transportation of sensitive 
documents 
1 1.0 
Information security audit or inspections 2 2.0 
Biometric or electronic access control system or 
card readers or access cards 
7 7.0 
Shredder machine in place 9 9.0 
Gates, electronic key pads, locks and keys 1 1.0 
Documents are kept in Archives 1 1.0 
Digital information is protected by pin codes 1 1.0 
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Documents are stored in the registry 1 1.0 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, physical 
security or guarding and patrolling 
2 2.0 
Security awareness programme or security briefing 8 8.0 
E-mails, brochures, handbooks and internal letters 1 1.0 
Security Committee meetings or Risk Management 
Committee 
2 2.0 
Support from top management 1 1.0 
Security points at all buildings 1 1.0 
No access is allowed in the premises if an 
employee or visitor does not have security 
clearance 
1 1.0 
Visitors cards are implemented 1 1.0 
Signing of access control register 1 1.0 
Authorisation must be given before a file is given 
out to an official 
1 1.0 
Spyware  1 1.0 
Information is dispatched in sealed temper proof 
double envelopes  
4 4.0 
Top secret clearance  3 3.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The study shows that most government departments prefer using lockable steel 
cabinets, safes, strong rooms, walk in safe, reinforced steel cabinets and optimisers 
as security risk control measures for the protection of security information in 
government departments. 
 
Deduction: 
Lockable steel cabinets, safes, strong rooms, walk in safe, reinforced steel cabinets 
and optimisers are preferred by most of government departments. According to the 
“MISS” cabinet document (1998), this type of security risk control measures should 
be used by government departments to store the documents that contain classified 
information. Few of the respondents responded to other security risk control 
measures because they were the only security risk control measures implemented in 
their departments. It is clear that respondents could not mention the security risk 
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control measures that are not implemented in their departments. Few participants 
indicated that their departments conduct security audit or inspections. It is expected 
from all government departments to ensure that information audits are conducted in 
order to monitor compliance in terms of the “MISS” document. It has been identified 
that few of government departments use registry to store classified documents 
because other government departments do not know the importance of storing 
classified documents in the registry. There is a clear indication that only few 
government departments use access control registers in order to control their access 
to their premises. Only few government departments adhered to the “MISS” 
document with regards to the classification of sensitive information because other 
government departments do not have knowledge on how to classify documents 
containing sensitive information.  A very low percent of government departments use 
computer passwords to protect sensitive information stored in computers which 
becomes a high risk to government information. The main reason is that most 
government departments do not distinguish between non-sensitive and sensitive 
information. As a result, they did not have any security risk control measures to 
protect information stored in computers (South Africa 1998). 
 
4.4.2. Effectiveness of security risk control measures (See Annexure A question 
7). 
Table 4.7 Effectiveness of security risk control measures in government 
departments (N=100) 
Do you find the security risk control measures at your 
department to be effective? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  57 57.0 
No 43 43.0 
Total 100 100.0 
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Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants found the existing security risk control measures in 
their departments to be effective. 
 
Deduction 
The study shows that the identified security risk control measures are perceived to 
be effective because most of government departments do not know about other 
security risk control measures that could be used for the protection of security 
information. A very low percent of participants indicated that the existing security risk 
control measures in their departments are not effective because they are not 
implemented in full as required by the “MISS” document. In addition, it is because of 
lack of support from top management. 
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4.4.3. Ineffectiveness of security risk control measures (See Annexure A 
question 8). 
 
Table 4.8 Reason for ineffectiveness of security risk control measures (N=100) 
If no, please say why you find these measures to be 
ineffective? 
Frequency Percentage 
There is still corruption by internal staff and cannot be 
detected. 
3 3.0 
Lots of dockets are missing from the registry. 1 1.0 
Identification of staff is not adequate. 1 1.0 
Classification of documents is not done by all 
components. 
2 2.0 
The organisational structure is too thin. 1 1.0 
Police Officers are not always in the office to handle 
files. 
1 1.0 
If there is a breakdown in security it takes a long time to 
fix the problem.  
1 1.0 
The controls might be in place but due to human factor, 
officials are easily tempted in giving out information 
regardless of controls. 
1 1.0 
There is non-compliance to security directives such as 
MISS, MPSS and security measures due to lack of 
support from top management. 
27 27.0 
Delay in vetting of officials by SSA, failure to subject 
officials to vetting and vetting is a once off thing and 
people tend to forget about it. 
4 4.0 
Hand metal detector is not reliable. 1 1.0 
Lack of knowledge by staff and we need trained Security 
Officers. 
2 2.0 
Insufficient safes 1 1.0 
Dangerous weapons are always found in possession of 
the public members. 
1 1.0 
Detectives leave the dockets unattended. 1 1.0 
Wrong people can lay hands on official’s access cards. 1 1.0 
There is no encryption devices installed on the 
communication system. 
1 1.0 
There is no security policy in place. 18 18.0 
Integrated security system is broken and left unrepaired. 4 4.0 
Sharing of building create a problem when it comes to 
the control by security officers. 
5 5.0 
Insufficient fund or security budget.  12 12.0 
Lack of qualified security staff. 11 11.0 
Total  100 100.0 
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Interpretation: 
Most of the respondents who participated in the study indicated that there is non-
compliance to security directives such as “MISS”, “MPSS” and security measures 
due to lack of support from top management. 
 
Deduction: 
The reason for non-compliance to security legislations is because there is no penalty 
to be imposed to government departments if they fail to comply. The study also 
shows that few government departments operate without security policy. 
Consequently, the security risk control measures are ineffective. The other risk that 
contributes to ineffectiveness of security risk control measures in government 
departments is insufficient fund or security budget. Most of security risk control 
measures such as electronic devices are very expensive and they require more 
money. 
  
4.4.4. Leakage of information (See Annexure A question 9). 
Table 4.9 Leakage of information (N=100) 
Indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Leakage of information at Government department can be reduced if 
proper security risk control measures can be implemented effectively 
by Security Managers 
 Frequency Percentage 
Strongly agree 58 58 
Agree  33 33 
Neutral  7 7 
Disagree  2 2 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
One hundred (100) Information Security Managers had conflicting views about 
leakage of information.  However, the majority strongly agreed that leakage of 
information may be reduced if Security Risk Control Measures could be implemented 
effectively by government departments.   
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Deduction: 
There is a clear indication that Information Security Managers have positive minds, 
passion and are willing to have effective security risk control measures in place 
within their respective government departments. In addition, low percentage agreed 
with the above statement because it is their responsibility to ensure that the 
protection of security information is implemented in government departments. On the 
contrary, a very lower percentage of participants were neutral because they were not 
sure whether there is any other security risk control measures that could be 
implemented in their departments accept the one implemented currently. The lowest 
of participants disagreed with the above statement because they do not believe that 
there are other security risk control measures for the protection of security 
information that could be implemented and work better than the one they have 
implemented in their departments.  
 
4.4.5. Security policies and procedures (See Annexure A question 10). 
Table 4.10 Availability of security policies and procedures (N=100) 
Do you have security policies and procedures in place 
at your department pertaining to protection of security 
information? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 78 78.0 
No  22 22.0 
Total 100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The study shows that most government departments have security policies and 
procedures in place in their departments pertaining to the protection of security 
information.  
 
Deduction:  
The majority of the government departments have security policies and procedures 
in place because they want to protect government information. A very low percent of 
participants indicated that their departments do not have security policy because 
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they do not see it as an important document. Security policy is the cornerstone of the 
institution especially when it comes to security risk control measures. According to 
Morgan and Boardman (2012:89), it is good practice for government departments to 
adopt written policies that set out principles and procedures that will ensure 
compliance with government legislations. In the event of any complaint or request by 
a data subject under the Act, the evidence that an organisation has clear written and 
enforced procedures for strict compliance may help to strengthen the organisation’s 
case. Peltier, Peltier and Blackley (2005:17) added that security policy is the first and 
probably most important aspect of information security.  
 
4.4.6. Familiarity with security policies and procedures (See Annexure A 
question 11). 
Table 4.11 Extent to which respondents are familiar with security policies and 
procedures (N=100) 
How familiar are you with the security policies and 
procedures? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Very familiar 78 78.0 
Not familiar 22 22.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The aim of this question was to determine whether respondents were familiar with 
security policy and procedures currently implemented in government departments. 
The majority of the participants are very familiar with the policies and procedures. 
 
Deduction: 
Indeed, the majority of the participants should be familiar with the policies and 
procedures because they are responsible for the development and implementation of 
those policies and procedures. A very low percent of participants were not familiar 
with the policies and procedures because they were not involved in the development 
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of such policies and procedures. In addition, some of those security policies are not 
yet approved or presented to all employees. 
 
4.4.7. Access control to Registry (See Annexure A question 12) 
Table 4.12 Access control to Registries (N=100) 
How is access to the registry controlled in your 
department? 
Frequency Percentage 
By electronic access control systems 32 32.0 
By registry officials only 29  29.0 
By a counter with burglar bars  14  14.0 
Through access control registers 11 11.0 
Through vetted Human Resources personnel  only 2 2.0 
By key custodians  3 3.0 
By high security keys and locks 2 2.0 
There is a surveillance camera on the passage to the 
registry which monitors movement of staff 
2 2.0 
Pre-arrangements or special request permits are 
completed and approved prior to access the registry 
3 3.0 
By in-house security officers 2 2.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants indicated that access to Registries is controlled 
through electronic access control systems.  
 
Deduction  
Most government departments control their access to Registry through electronic 
access control systems because it keeps records of the people who had access on a 
daily basis. This system can be used to deny access to unauthorised persons.  Few 
government departments have installed surveillance cameras to monitor the 
movement of staff. Most government departments did not install surveillance 
cameras because they are not aware that this type of security risk control measure 
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could assist them to monitor the movement of staff who enter or leave the registry. 
Only few of the participants indicated that their access to the registry is controlled by 
key custodians. Most government departments are not aware of the importance to 
have a key custodian and his or her functions. Once again, access to registry in few 
government departments is done through vetted Human Resource personnel only 
because they know the protection of security information than most government 
departments. According to Landoll (2011:227), access control provides mechanisms 
that restrict access to resources to only those authorised to have access; hence, 
government departments should ensure that access to Registries is controlled to 
avoid unauthorised entry. 
 
4.4.8. Control over outgoing and incoming documents (See Annexure A 
question 13) 
Table 4.13.1 Outgoing register for classified documents (N=89) 
 
Do you have outgoing register for classified documents? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  73 73.0 
No  16 16.0 
Total 89 89.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants said that they control outgoing classified documents 
by means of a register. Eleven (11) participants did not respond to this question 
because they were not sure whether their departments have an outgoing register for 
classified documents. 
 
Deduction: 
It appears as though all outgoing documents including classified documents are 
recorded in a register for control purpose. A low percentage of respondents indicated 
that they do not have a register for outgoing documents and as a result, classified 
information is at risk because it is not protected or controlled appropriately as 
required by the “MISS” document. The lowest percentage of participants who did not 
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respond poses a security risk because it appears that their departments do not have 
a register for outgoing classified documents.  
 
Table 4.13.2 Incoming register for classified documents (N=79) 
Do you have an incoming register for classified 
documents? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  72 72.0 
No  7 7.0 
Total 79 79.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the Information Security Managers indicated that they have a register 
for incoming classified documents. However, twenty one (21) participants did not 
respond to this question because they were not aware if their departments have an 
incoming register for classified documents. 
 
Deduction: 
There is a clear indication that this register is not dedicated for classified documents 
only. The risk is that one register is used for both unclassified documents and 
classified documents. A very low percentage of participants indicated that they do 
not have a register for incoming classified documents and this poses a security risk 
on classified information that might fall under wrong hands. Twenty one percent 
(21%) who did not respond to the above question also poses a risk because it shows 
clearly that their departments do not have a register for incoming classified 
documents for the protection of security information.  
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4.4.9 Removal and dispatching of documents (See Annexure A question 14) 
Table 4.14 Removal and dispatching of classified documents from premises 
(N=100) 
How are classified documents removed or dispatched from the premises?  
Sealed security envelopes and mail bags 30 30.0 
Signing of registers 20 20.0 
Messenger drivers 10 10.0 
Departmental vehicles 12 12.0 
Courier services  11 11.0 
Steel containers with high security locks 5 5.0 
Written authorisation from the Director General or 
Head of security 
4 4.0 
By vetted officials  2 2.0 
Removal permit  2 2.0 
By hand 1 1.0 
Normal envelopes 1 1.0 
Electronically encrypted and password produced 1 1.0 
Transported with vehicles fitted with tracking devices 1 1.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the respondents who participated in this study pointed out that the 
removal and dispatching of classified documents from the premises is done through 
sealed security envelopes and mail bags. 
 
Deduction: 
Most respondents pointed out that the removal and dispatching of classified 
documents from their premises is done through sealed security envelopes and mail 
bags because they know that the information will be protected. The risk identified in 
most government departments is the removal and dispatching of classified 
documents by hand and the use of normal envelopes as the information will not be 
protected. The study further indicates that only a few percentage of government 
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departments are using encryption devices and passwords when dispatching and 
removing classified documents from their premises. Moreover, most government 
departments that do not use encryption devices on electronic equipment that 
transmit classified information are at risk as their information can be intercepted at 
any time without being noticed or detected. According to the “MISS” cabinet 
document (1998), encryption devices should be used on electronic equipment that 
transmits classified information in order to prevent interception by unauthorised 
people. Furthermore, few participants indicated that classified documents are 
removed or dispatched by vetted officials. It becomes a risk to the departments that 
use officials that are not vetted because classified information may be compromised 
(South Africa 1998). 
 
4.4.10. Security programmes (See Annexure A question 15) 
Table 4.15 Security programmes for the protection of security information in 
government departments (N=100) 
What security programmes are in place to make the staff 
security conscious with regard to protection of security 
information?  
 Frequency Percentage 
Security Awareness, education 
and training 
61 61.0 
Newsletters and circulars 32 32.0 
E-mails  3 3.0 
Orders  1 1.0 
Inspection or Audit 3 3.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
Most Information Security Managers indicated that they have security awareness, 
education and training programmes in place to make the staff security conscious 
with regard to the protection of security information. 
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Deduction  
The majority of government departments have security awareness, education and 
training programmes because they want to educate the employees and make them 
aware of Security Risk Control Measures for the protection of security information. It 
becomes a risk to few government departments that do not have this kind of security 
programmes as their employees are not informed about security risk control 
measures for the protection of security information. The study further revealed that 
few government departments use inspection or audit to make their employees 
security conscious with regard to the protection of security information of which this 
is not a suitable security programme for this aspect. Nevertheless, inspection could 
not be used to make the staff security conscious. It clearly shows that the 
participants who mentioned inspection or audit do not have appropriate security 
programmes to make their staff security conscious for the protection of security 
information. 
 
Tipton and Krause (2000:200) added that in order to be successful, a security 
awareness programme must be implemented and it must stress how security will 
support the department’s business objectives. All employees want to know how to 
get things accomplished and to whom to turn for assistance. A strong awareness 
programme will provide those important elements. Furthermore, all employees need 
to know and understand management’s directives relating to the protection of 
security information. One of the key objectives of a security awareness programme 
is to ensure that all employees get this message.  
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4.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK 
4.5.1 Security risks associated with the protection of security information (See 
Annexure A question 16) 
Table 4.16 Security risks associated with the protection of security information 
(N=100) 
What security risks are associated with the 
protection of security information in government 
departments? 
Frequency Percentage 
Theft of documents containing sensitive information 15 15.0 
Theft of computers containing sensitive information 3 3.0 
Leakage of information by staff members 15 15.0 
Unavailability of security measures for the protection 
of sensitive information 
1 1.0 
Employee negligence   with regard to office security. 2 2.0 
Espionage 10 10.0 
Lack of information security awareness sessions 1 1.0 
Breach of confidentiality 6 6.0 
Abuse of privileged information 5 5.0 
Tempering with information or destruction and 
alteration 
6 6.0 
Misrepresentation of data 4 4.0 
The improper removal of documents (including 
information in electronic format)  
4 4.0 
Terrorist and cyber attack 4 4.0 
Disaster such as flood and fire 2 2.0 
Unauthorised access to sensitive information 3 3.0 
Fraud and corruption 7 7.0 
Serious harm 2 2.0 
Demoralised staff members 1 1.0 
Throwing away documents instead of shredding them 1 1.0 
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Publication with the intend to discredit government 1 1.0 
Transportation of classified information by couriers 
who are not vetted  
1 1.0 
Lack of communication and ignorance 1 1.0 
Burglary in offices 2 2.0 
Appointing foreign intelligence agent 1 1.0 
Missing files 1 1.0 
Employees who are not vetted 1 1.0 
Computer virus 1 1.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
Most of the respondents who participated indicated that there is theft of documents 
containing sensitive information and the leakage of information by staff members.  
 
Deduction 
Most government employees who do not earn enough and as a result, they end up 
involving themselves in theft and leakage of information. Schweitzer (1996:144) is of 
the view that the necessary procedures must be followed for the protection of 
security information because without appropriate security risk control measures, 
government information will be compromised and ultimately be stolen or fall under 
the wrong hands. 
 
4.5.2 Theft of information (See Annexure A question 17) 
Table 4.17 Theft of information in government departments (N=99) 
Did you ever experience theft of information in your 
department? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 61 61.0 
No  38 38.0 
Total 99 99.0 
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Interpretation: 
This question was intended to find out if there was theft of information in government 
departments. However, one participant did not respond to this question because he 
or she was not aware of any theft of information occurred in his or her department. 
The majority of participants indicated that they have experienced theft of information 
in their departments. A very low percentage of the participants responded negatively 
because they did not experience theft of information in their departments. 
 
Deduction  
Theft of information in government department is high because of lack of sufficient 
security risk control measures. If security risk control measures could be 
implemented in full, the rate of theft will not be high.  
 
4.5.3 Method used by perpetrators to steal information (See Annexure A 
question 18) 
Table 4.18 Method used to steal information in government department 
(N=100)  
If ‘yes’ please indicate below how this 
information was stolen in your 
department.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Theft of computer and laptops from offices 11 
(11%) 
5 
(5%) 
2 
(2%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
Theft of laptops from official’s own vehicles 12 
(12%) 
4 
(4%) 
7 
(7%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
Missing files from registry 2  
(2%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
3 
(3%) 
Burglary in office 1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
Corruption by internal employees 6 
(6%) 
4 
(4%) 
4 
(4%) 
4 
(4%) 
16 
(16%) 
Interception from computer/ computer 
hacking 
3 
(3%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
1 
(1%) 
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Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants indicated that information was stolen from their 
department through theft of laptops and computers either from office or vehicles. 
However, corruption by internal employees was rated very high.  
 
Deduction:  
Laptops and computers keep more information that may be retrieved if stolen by 
unauthorised persons. In addition, laptops and computers are very expensive and 
can make more money if someone sells them at a good price. According to “MISS” 
cabinet document, (1998), all computer storage media that contains classified 
information must be handled according to the document security standards. 
 
4.5.4 Reporting of crime (See Annexure A question 19) 
Table 4.19 Establishing whether crime is reported by respondents (N=77) 
Did you report any of these experienced crime or theft 
of information? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 62 62.0 
No  15 15.0 
Total 77 77.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the respondents who participated in the study indicated that they 
have reported the crime they have experienced. Fifteen (15) participants responded 
negatively to this question because they were not aware whether the experienced 
crime or theft of information was reported or not. 
 
Deduction  
Theft of information was reported because the departments wanted to prevent 
classified information stolen. In addition, the main purpose of reporting crime is to 
ensure that the case is investigated maybe the culprit or the stolen item could be 
found. In table  4.19 , which displays the data on reported crime, it is clear that very 
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few cases were not reported whereas more crime were reported to the relevant 
people or institutions and will be investigated by the SAPS. The fifteen percent (15%) 
of unrecorded crime is regarded as the “dark figure”. Therefore, the dark figure is 
highly concentrated at the nonserious end of the crime seriousness spectrum. What 
has to be stressed is that it cannot be assumed that the amounts of unrecorded 
crime have stayed constant throughout in government departments (Walsh and 
Hemmens 2011:43). 
 
4.5.5 Institution or People to whom crime was reported (See Annexure A 
question 20) 
Table 4.20 Institutions or People to whom crime was reported in government 
department (N=100) 
If ‘yes’, to whom did you report these crime or theft of 
information? 
 Frequency Percentage 
State Security Agency (SSA) 14 14.0 
Head of Department 16 16.0 
South African Police Service 
(SAPS) 
40 40.0 
Manager or Supervisor 30 30.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
Most crimes were reported to the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Manager 
or Supervisor followed by Head of Department and State Security Agency. 
Deduction 
Employees within government departments have faith in the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) as well as their Managers or Supervisors. Employees believe that if 
crime is reported to these people or institution, actions will be done from security 
point of view. Employees are aware that the risk of reporting the crime to the State 
Security Agency, Head of Department, Managers or Supervisors is that crime might 
not be investigated properly as compared to the SAPS. In addition, employees are 
not receiving feedback from their Manager or Supervisor if crime is reported to them. 
Furthermore, it becomes a risk to report a crime and at the end of the day there is no 
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case number that could be used for enquiries if crime is reported to the State 
Security Agency, Head of Department, Manager or Supervisor as compared to the 
SAPS. SAP as a government system is legally mandated to manage the policing of 
crime. Therefore, government departments rely more on SAPS with regards to the 
reporting of crime that occurred in their organisations (Ross 2000:157). 
 
4.5.6 Action taken after crime was reported (See Annexure A question 21) 
Table 4.21 Action taken after crime was reported (N=64) 
Was any action taken after this incident or theft of 
information was reported? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  57 57.0 
No  7 7.0 
Total  64 64.0 
 
Interpretation:  
The majority of the participants replied that action was taken after this incident or 
theft of information was reported. However, 36 participants did not respond to this 
question because this type of crime did not occur in their departments.  
 
Deduction  
Seven percent (7%) of participants indicated that no action was taken after theft of 
information was reported and this poses a high risk to government departments. The 
majority of the participants indicated that action was taken by relevant officials and 
institutions. This is presented in the next table.  
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4.5.7 Specific action (See Annexure A question 22) 
Table 4.22 Specific action that was taken after crime was reported (N=57) 
If yes specify what was done? 
 Frequency Percentage 
 Investigations were conducted by 
State Security Agency (SSA), South 
African Police Services (SAPS) and 
internal security 
47 47.0 
Disciplinary measures taken 5 5.0 
Criminal case opened 4 4.0 
Fingerprints were taken 1 1.0 
Total  57 57.0 
 
Interpretation:  
The majority of the participants indicated that investigations were conducted by SSA, 
SAPS and internal security. However, the participants did not respond to this 
question because there was no crime reported to their departments or no action was 
taken after theft of information was reported to their manager or supervisor and Head 
of Department. 
 
Deduction  
Forty three percent (43%) of the participants did not report theft of crime that took 
place in their department. As a result, they did not respond to the above question. It 
is a risk for government departments if they fail to report crime that occurs in their 
departments as no action will be taken against the culprit. The table above indicates 
clearly that the majority of government departments have reported a crime to SSA, 
SAPS and internal security who in return conducted investigations.  
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4.5.8 Security clearance certificates (See Annexure A question 23) 
Table 4.23 Security clearance certificate issued to employees (N=93) 
Do all personnel who handle sensitive information in 
your department have a valid security clearance 
certificates? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  50 50.0 
No  47 47.0 
Total  97 97.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was aimed at checking whether the personnel handling sensitive 
information has valid security clearance certificates. Majority of Information Security 
Managers responded that personnel handling sensitive information in their 
departments have valid security clearance certificates. Three (3) participants did not 
respond to this question because they were not aware whether employees in their 
departments have a valid security clearance certificates. 
 
Deduction  
Forty seven percent (47%) of the participants responded negatively while three 
percent (3%) did not respond to the above question because employees in their 
departments are handling sensitive information without a valid security clearance 
certificates. In other words, information may be compromised and fall under wrong 
hands or unauthorised persons. Furthermore, only fifty percent (50%) of government 
departments have a valid security clearance certificates and this poses a high risk to 
government information. Most government employees will then have access to 
classified information while they do not have a valid security clearance certificates 
which offers them an authority to access and handle classified information.   
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4.5.9 Level of security clearance (See Annexure A question 24) 
Table 4.24Level of security clearance certificate issued to employees (N=50) 
If ‘yes’ please indicate the level of security clearance they have.  
 Frequency Percentage 
Top secret 6 6.0 
Secret 4 4.0 
Confidential 21 21.0 
Top secret, secret and 
confidential 
7 7.0 
Secret and confidential 12 12.0 
Total  50 50.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to determine the level of security clearance certificates 
issued to employees. The majority of the participants indicated that employees in 
government departments are cleared to the level of confidential. Nevertheless, the 
participants did not respond to this question because their departments do not 
comply with the “MISS” document. 
 
Deduction: 
The table above shows that most of the employees in government departments are 
cleared to the level of confidentiality because they deal mostly with confidential 
information than secret or top secret information. However, the participants did not 
respond to this question because their departments do not comply with the “MISS” 
documents. Non-compliance to the “MISS” documents is identified as a risk to those 
government departments where 50 participants came from, because classified 
information will be compromised and handled by unauthorised people who may also 
leak or steal it for their personal gain. 
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4.5.10 Receiving of mail (See Annexure A question 25) 
Table 4.25 Receiving of mail or files by employees (N=97) 
 How do employees receive official files within their sections? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Signing mail register 27 27.0 
Security envelopes 9 9.0 
Hand delivered 10 10.0 
Non-security envelopes 6 6.0 
Signing mail register and security envelopes 10 10 
Signing mail register and hand delivered 26 26.0 
Security envelopes and hand delivered 8 68.0 
Signing mail register, security envelopes 
and hand delivered 
1 1.0 
Total  97 97.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was aimed at establishing how mail or files are received by the 
employees. Most of respondents who participated in the research answered that 
employees in their departments are signing mail register when receiving their mail. 
However, the participants did not respond to this question because they did not have 
knowledge on how employees receive their mail or official files in their department. 
 
Deduction:  
The reason for signing mail register is for control purpose and to ensure the 
protection of security information. This process will assist Registry personnel should 
there be any mail missing from their offices. A very low percentage of the 
participants mentioned various security risk control measures for receiving their mail 
and official files. However, three participants did not respond to this question 
because they do not have any security risk control measures in place in their 
departments for the receiving of mail and official files which is a high risk for the 
protection of security information. It is also a risk to government departments that the 
use of non-security envelopes for classified documents as the information is not 
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protected. Non-security envelopes can be easily be opened by a person who deliver 
the mail without being noticed. In addition, mail or files containing classified 
information will easily be accessed by unauthorised persons if there is no proper 
security risk control measure in place when mail or official files are received. 
According to Solove and Schwartz (2011:56), any organisation disseminating 
records of identified personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their 
intended use and must take reasonable security risk control measures to prevent the 
misuse of the data.  
 
4.6. SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
 
4.6.1 Security risk control measures for photocopying classified documents 
(See Annexure A question 26) 
Table 4.26 Security risk control measures for photocopying classified 
documents (N=99) 
Are there security risk control measures in place 
when photocopying classified documents? 
Yes  46 46.0 
No  53 53.0 
Total  99 99.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants answered that there are no security risk control 
measures in place when photocopying classified documents. One (1) participant did 
not respond to this question because he or she was not aware of whether there was 
security risk control measures implemented in his or her department for the 
photocopying of classified documents. Forty six (46) participants indicated that they 
have security risk control measures in place when photocopying classified 
documents in their departments and will be discussed in the table that follows. 
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Deduction: 
Most government departments fail to implement security risk control measures for 
photocopying classified documents because they do not know what security risk 
control measures to be used to protect sensitive information when photocopying 
classified documents.  
 
4.6.2 Specific security risk control measures (See Annexure A question 27) 
Table 4.27 Specific security risk control measures for photocopying classified 
documents (N=46) 
If ‘yes’ please specify. 
 Frequency Percentage 
Photocopying register 35 35.0 
Pin codes  2 2.0 
Dedicated photocopy machine for classified 
information 
3 3.0 
No copies unless authorised 2 2.0 
Photocopy machine is encrypted 2 2.0 
Classified documents are photocopied by the 
documents owner 
1 1.0 
Photocopy machine is placed in a separate 
office where is not accessible by everybody 
1 1.0 
Total  46 46.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to establish what security risk control measures are in 
place for photocopying classified documents. The majority of Information Security 
Managers revealed that a register for photocopying classified documents is in place. 
However, 54 of them did not respond to this question because they do not have any 
security measure implemented in their departments for photocopying classified 
documents. These participants were complaining about insufficient budget and lack 
of support from top management. In addition, security awareness programmes are 
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not being sufficiently implemented by all government departments with regard to the 
security risk control measures for the photocopying classified documents.  
 
Deduction: 
The majority of the participants mentioned that a register for photocopying classified 
documents is in place for control purposes. Few government departments mentioned 
different security risk control measures however it becomes a risk to these 
departments that do not have any security risk control measures in place. In other 
words, government information will not be safe because there is no security risk 
control measures in almost fifty four percent of government departments as indicated 
by the participants for the photocopying of classified documents. According to 
Whitman and Mattord (2008:272), if copies of classified information are not 
controlled properly, classified information may be compromised or fall into wrong 
hands. 
 
4.6.3 Security risk control measures for destruction of redundant documents 
(See Annexure A question 28) 
Table 4.28 Security risk control measures for destruction of redundant 
documents (N=100) 
Are there security risk control measures when the 
destruction of redundant documents containing 
sensitive information is done? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  46 46.0 
No  54 54.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the respondents that participated in this study replied that there is no 
security risk control measures when the destruction of redundant documents 
containing sensitive information is done. Forty six percent (46%) of the participants 
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responded positively to this question and have managed to indicate the security risk 
control measures that are in place for the destruction of redundant classified 
documents. These security risk control measures will be discussed in the next table 
that follow. 
Deduction: 
The majority of the participants responded negatively because they do not have any 
security risk control measures in place for the destruction of redundant classified 
documents. The participants indicated that security is not recognised by top 
management and therefore they are unable to implement security risk control 
measures. In addition, the participants mentioned that employees do not attend to 
security awareness programmes so that they could be educated on how to protect 
classified information in their departments. A very low percentage, that is, 46 of the 
participants responded positively. However, this is not satisfactory in terms of 
compliance to the “MISS” document. According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), 
government departments are subjected to the Archives Act, 1962, when destruction 
of classified documents done. Furthermore, when destruction has been properly 
authorised, it should take place by burning or a shredder (South Africa 1998). 
 
4.6.4 Specific type of security risk control measures for destruction of 
redundant documents (See Annexure A question 29) 
Table 4.29 Specific security risk control measures for destruction of redundant 
documents (N=46) 
If ‘yes’ please specify the type of security risk control measures? 
 Frequency Percentage 
 Shredding machine 31 31.0 
Burning  4 4.0 
Approval from the National Archives 11 11.0 
Total  46 46.0 
 
Interpretation:  
This question was intended to find out about types of security risk control measures 
implemented for the destruction of redundant documents. The majority of the 
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participants stated that shredding machines are used for the destruction of 
redundant documents followed by approval from the National Archives and burning. 
However, some of the respondents did not respond to this question because they did 
not know what type of security risk control measures were implemented in their 
departments for the destruction of redundant documents, or generally they did not 
have any security risk control measure in place. 
 
Deduction: 
It is a risk that fifty four percent (54%) of the respondents that do not have any 
security risk control measures in place for the destruction of redundant classified 
documents. If these documents are thrown away without being destroyed, 
information may fall under wrong hands or unauthorised persons and at the end of 
the day this might cause harm to government departments or affect their objectives. 
A very few of the participants responded positively to this question. This shows that 
they adhere to the “MISS” document, thus, shredding machines are used for the 
destruction of redundant documents in order to protect sensitive information that 
might be thrown away by government employees.  
Whitman and Mattord (2008: 272) are of the view that if shredding machines are not 
used, the people who engage in dumpster diving may retrieve information and 
thereby compromise the protection of security information within government 
departments.  
 
4.6.5 Protection of communication equipment (See Annexure A question 30) 
Table 4.30 Protection of communication equipment for interception (N=46) 
 
 
 
Are communication equipment protected for interception 
in your department? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  36 36.0 
No  62 62.0 
Total 98 98.0 
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Interpretation:  
This question was asked to determine if security control measures are in place for 
protection of communication equipment. The majority of the participants retorted that 
there are no security control measures in place for protection of communication 
equipment. Two (2) participants did not respond to this question because they were 
not aware whether communication equipment was protected for interception in their 
departments. Thirty six percent (36%) of the respondents responded positively 
because they have security risk control measures in place which will be presented in 
the table that follows. 
 
Deduction: 
Most participants responded negatively to this question because of lack of sufficient 
budget to purchase the encryption devices that could be used for the protection of 
the communication equipment for interception. In addition, some participants 
indicated that they do not know the security equipment to be used to protect their 
communication equipment from interception of which this becomes a high risk for 
those government departments that are affected by this. 
Very few participants responded positively because they are trying to comply with 
the “MISS” document, thus, their communication equipment is protected for 
interception. Table 4.31 will present the security risk control measures that are 
implemented in order to protect communication equipment as indicated by the thirty 
six participants. 
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4.6.6 Explanation on the protection of communication equipment (See 
Annexure A question 31) 
Table 4.31 Explanation on the protection of communication equipment for 
interception (N=36) 
If ‘yes’ please explain how is it protected. 
 Frequency Percentage 
Communication equipment are 
protected by encryption devices  
29 29.0 
Firewalls, antivirus, passwords, pin 
codes and spyware  
6 6.0 
Scrambler on all telephones 1 1.0 
Total  36 36.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants answered that communication equipment is 
protected by encryption devices followed by firewalls, antivirus, passwords, pin 
codes, spyware and scrambler on all telephones.  However, 64 participants did not 
respond to this question because their communication equipment is not protected for 
interception. 
 
Deduction: 
Only thirty six (36) of the participants responded positively. This becomes a high risk 
to government information as it appears that most of participants responded very 
negatively. If communication equipment is not protected as prescribed by “MISS” 
document, classified information will be transmitted unsafely and might fall under 
unauthorised persons.  
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4.6.7 Storage facilities for classified documents (See Annexure A question 32) 
Table 4.32 Storage facilities for classified documents N=100) 
Are there safes, strong rooms or re-enforced steel cabinets for 
the storage of classified documents in your department? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  98 98.0 
No 2 2.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants cited that there are safes, strong rooms and re-
enforced steel cabinets in place for the storage of classified documents. 
Nonetheless, only a few percentage of the participants responded negatively 
because their departments do not have funds to purchase or install the above 
mentioned security risk control measures. 
 
Deduction: 
Ninety eight percent (98%) of the participants responded positively because their 
departments complied in terms of the “MISS” document as they are compelled to 
have safes, strong rooms and re-enforced steel cabinets for the storage of classified 
documents. It is a risk to the two percent of the departments that do not comply to 
the “MISS” document as this will result with their department losing classified 
information due to lack of security risk control measures.  
 
4.6.8 Storage facilities in general (See Annexure A question 33) 
Table 4.33 Storage facilities for classified documents (N=2) 
If ‘no’ please indicate how are classified documents stored in 
your department? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Wooden filing cabinets 2 2.0 
Total  2 2.0 
90 
 
90 
 
 
Interpretation: 
Two percent (2%) of the respondents who participated in the study cited that 
classified documents are stored in wooden filling cabinets. Ninety eight (98) 
participants did not respond to this question because they do not use wooden filing 
cabinets, instead they use safes, strong rooms and re-enforced steel cabinets for the 
storage of classified documents not wooden. 
 
Deduction: 
There is a clear indication that government departments who use wooden filling 
cabinets do not have appropriate storage facilities such as re-enforced steel 
cabinets, safes and strong rooms to store classified information.  
 
4.6.9 Access control to computer room (See Annexure A question 34) 
Table 4.34 Access control to computer room (N=100) 
Is access to computer/sever/network room controlled? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  100 100.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to determine if there were security measures for the control 
of access to computer room. All participants agreed that there are security measures 
in place for the control of access to computer room. 
 
Deduction: 
Access to computer room is controlled in order to prevent unauthorised entry by 
unauthorised persons.  
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4.6.10 Specific security measures for computer room (See Annexure A question 
35) 
Table 4.35 Specific security measures for computer room (N=98) 
If ‘yes’ please specify how it is controlled? 
 Frequency Percentage 
 By Information Technology (IT) 
personnel only 
49 49.0 
CCTV, security door and locks 5 5.0 
Electronic access control system 39 39.0 
Security registers 5 5.0 
Total  98 98.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was aimed at looking specifically at the type of security measures 
implemented for the control of access to computer room. The majority of the 
participants indicated that access to computer room is controlled by Information 
Technology “IT” personnel only. The next highest percent of the participants 
indicated electronic access control. The lowest percentage of participants indicated 
CCTV, security door, locks and security registers. However, two (2) participants did 
not respond to this question because their computer room is not controlled. 
 
Deduction: 
Ninety eight percent (98%) of the participants indicated that they have security risk 
control measures for computer room. It becomes a risk for the two percent (2%) of 
government departments that do not comply to the “MISS” document with regard to 
the implementation of security risk control measures for computer room in order to 
protect government information. This may result with government information being 
tempered with or computer system being intercepted by unauthorised person who 
will have uncontrolled access to the computer room. The main risk is that if access to 
computer room is not controlled, every employee will have access and may temper 
with computer equipment or sever. According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), 
access to classified information should be controlled. Access to classified information 
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is limited to a person who has an appropriate security clearance or who is by way of 
exception authorised thereto by the head of the institution with due regard being paid 
to the need-to-know principle (South Africa 1998). Goodbody (2003:22), added that 
government departments should ensure that were computer screens (including 
laptops) are located in public areas, security measures should be taken to ensure 
that personal information is non inadvertently disclosed to members of the public. 
 
4.6.11 Protection of information in computers (See Annexure A question 36) 
Table 4.36 Protection of information in computers (N=100) 
Do computer users protect information stored in their computers? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  89 89.0 
No  11 11.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants confirmed that computer users protect information 
stored in their computers. A few percentage of the participants responded negatively 
that the computer users do not protect information stored in their computers. 
 
Deduction:  
Eleven percent (11%) of the participants responded negatively because their 
departments are not doing anything about the protection of information stored in the 
computers. Furthermore, those participants gave the reason that their IT section is 
responsible for computer equipment including the creation of passwords and 
installation of antivirus devices. Thus, they fail to protect information stored in the 
computers. It is a risk to government departments who do not have any security risk 
control measures to protect information stored in computers as computer hackers 
may have a free access to classified information.  The majority of the participants 
indicated that the computer users protect information stored in their computers 
because they prevent sensitive information from unauthorised persons. Computer 
users know that if they fail to protect information stored in their computers, it will be 
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compromised and that unauthorised persons will have a free access to classified 
information.  
 
4.6.12 Specific protection of information stored in computers (See Annexure A 
question 37) 
 
Table 4.37 Specific protection of information stored in computers (N=89) 
If ‘yes’ please specify how computer users protect information stored 
in their computers? 
 Frequency Percentage 
 Passwords 88  88.0 
Fire walls  and antivirus 1 1.1 
Total  89 89.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants mentioned that passwords are used by computer 
users to protect information stored in their computers. Only one (1) participant 
indicated fire wall and antivirus. However, 11 participants did not respond to this 
question because they did not know what security risk control measures were used 
in their departments to protect information stored in the computers. 
 
Deduction: 
It is a risk to government information to find that only one percent (1%) of the 
respondents who participated in this study has indicated fire wall and antivirus. This 
indicates that 99% of government departments have failed to install security risk 
control measures such as fire wall and antivirus to protect information stored in 
computers. In addition, 88 participants indicated computer password because to 
them this is the only security risk control measure that they know could assist them 
in protection classified information stored in the computers. 
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4.6.13 Approach by outside people (See Annexure A question 38) 
 
Table 4.38 Respondents approach by outside people (N=100)  
Have you ever been approached by outside people requesting you to 
provide government information in exchange of money or anything? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes  7 7.0 
No  93 93.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants said that they were not approached by outside 
people who requested information in exchange of money. A few percentage 
responded positively to this question and their explanations will be discussed in the 
table that follows.  
 
Deduction: 
Seven percent (7%) of the participants responded positively because outside people 
wanted to corrupt them. In addition, ninety three percent (93%) of the respondents 
responded negatively because they were not approached by any outside people as 
they are afraid to be arrested or convicted of fraud or corruption. According to 
Silverstone and Sheetz (2007:81), fraud is perpetrated against companies by 
outsiders and this has caused million in losses. Furthermore, the government 
departments are in real risk if they fail to implement an appropriate security risk 
control measures because the impact of fraud may result with million losses of 
government information. 
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4.6.14. Explanation on the approach by outside people (See Annexure A 
question 39) 
Table 4.39 Explanation on the approach by outside people (N=100)  
If ‘yes’ please explain how were you approached by outside people requesting 
you to provide government information in exchange of money or anything? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Respondents were approached by 
outsiders to steal files or dockets in 
exchange of money.  
2 2.0 
Respondents were requested to alter 
information from SAPS dockets or 
departmental tender documents. 
4 4.0 
Respondent was promised a vehicle 
in exchange of secret files. 
1 1.0 
Total  7 7.0 
 
Interpretation: 
The majority of the participants cited that they were approached by outside people 
who requested them to alter information from SAPS dockets or departmental tender 
documents. Few of the participants indicated that they were requested to alter 
information from SAPS dockets or departmental tender documents. Only one (1) 
participant indicated that he was promised a vehicle in exchange of secret files. 
Nonetheless, ninety three percent (93%) participants did not respond to this question 
because they were not approached by outside people requesting information from 
them in exchange of money. 
 
Deduction: 
Ninety three (93) participants did not respond as they were not approached by the 
outside people because they are afraid to be arrested of stealing government 
information. Four (4) of the participants indicated that they were requested to alter 
information from SAPS dockets or departmental tender documents in order to win 
the tender or their cases. One (1) participant indicated that he was promised a 
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vehicle in exchange of secret files because she wanted to cause harm to 
government officials who were involved in the awarding of tender for the rendering of 
cleaning services. 
 
According to Oosthuizen, Shapiro and Strauss (1983:54), “the free exchange of 
information and ideas is being seen in South Africa as a threat to those sectional 
interests that have become our legislature’s primary concern, and consequently, the 
news media have been subjected to the sweeping restraints and are additionally 
required to operate under constant government threats of increased censorship”. 
 
4.6.15 Solutions on the protection of security information in government 
departments (See Annexure A question 40) 
Table 4.40Types of security risk control measures (N=100) 
Which types of security risk control measures may 
be put in place for the protection of security 
information in government departments? 
Frequency Percentage 
Regular security awareness 1 1.0 
Vetting of employees to the level of top secret 10 10.0 
Restriction of access to sensitive areas 1 1.0 
Network security such as firewalls, password and 
antivirus 
1 1.0 
Information security audit 2 2.0 
Physical security for file 1 1.0 
Classification system for securing information 9 9.0 
Proper storage of information 6 6.0 
Proper dispatching of information and documents 6 6.0 
Proper destruction of information 5 5.0 
Signing of oath of secrecy 1 1.0 
Effective access control 2 2.0 
Policy on network devices 1 1.0 
Installation on encryption devices 1 1.0 
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Employee training on information security 1 1.0 
Shredding of documents that are unused 1 1.0 
Security awareness must be conducted on a monthly 
basis 
7 7.0 
Vigilance by Security Officers in terms of searching 
during access control at gates must be enforced more 
seriously 
1 1.0 
Implementation of integrated security system (CCTV, 
access control and fire warning) 
2 2.0 
High security locking system 1 1.0 
Effective access control system such as x-ray machine 1 1.0 
Appointment of information security officers 1 1.0 
All physical security measures 1 1.0 
Access to classified information must be denied to 
authorise people 
1 1.0 
South African police officers must be disciplined at all 
times 
1 1.0 
Prioritize critical areas such as vetting of personnel 1 1.0 
Backup system away from business premises 1 1.0 
I-pad must be handled the way computers are handled 1 1.0 
Burglar doors and burglar proofs must be installed in all 
offices 
1 1.0 
Upgrade security clearance of police officers to the level 
of top secret 
1 1.0 
All security measures recommended in the miss 
documents such as steel cabinets, strong room, safes 
and vetting of personnel 
1 1.0 
Finger prints /dump security ( Biometrics system) 2 2.0 
Encourage staff members to attend security awareness 
programme 
1 1.0 
Top management should support security system 1 1.0 
Strengthen the control of access to information and 1 1.0 
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communication technology equipment 
Protection of server room 1 1.0 
Burning the use of USB 1 1.0 
Searching upon entry and exit 1 1.0 
Proper register for sensitive information ( in & out going 
registers) 
1 1.0 
Circular 1 1.0 
Proper registry control measures 1 1.0 
Disciplinary measures must be taken against employees 
who conduct security breaches 
1 1.0 
Appointment of key custodian 1 1.0 
Purchasing of safes and re-enforced steel cabinets 1 1.0 
Appointment of information security managers 1 1.0 
All files should be locked away when not in use 1 1.0 
Photocopying machines cleared on knock off time 1 1.0 
Laptops must always be locked by the locking cables 1 1.0 
Bags with seals used by the messengers 1 1.0 
Ad-hoc scanning of memory sticks and external hard 
drives 
1 1.0 
Proper filing system that will allow SAPS to secure 
information 
1 1.0 
Stop out-sourcing security services to private security 
company 
1 1.0 
State Information Technology Agency ( SITA) must invest 
in new security measures to protect information 
1 1.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to determine what type of security risk control measures 
may be put in place for the protection of security information. The majority of the 
participants proposed that vetting of employees should be upgraded to the level of 
top secret. The next highest percent of the participants indicated the classification 
99 
 
99 
 
 
system for security information followed by security awareness that must be 
conducted on a monthly basis. A very low percentage of participants indicated other 
different types of security risk control measures that may be put in place for the 
protection of security information such as signing of oath of secrecy, installation of 
encryption devices, protection of server room and other security risk control 
measures as indicated on the above table.  
 
Deduction:  
The majority  of the participants emphasised that the vetting of employees should be 
upgraded to the level of top secret because they have realised that confidential 
clearance certificate lasted for a long period and employees may end up doing 
corruption and resign without being noticed. Confidential clearance lasts for a period 
of twenty (20) years of which this becomes a high risk to government information 
because an employee will join the department being clean knowing that he or she 
will not be detected if involved in any criminal activities for that period.  According to 
the “MISS” document, top secret clearance is reviewed every five years. 
Furthermore, the study revealed that sensitive information is not classified according 
to the “MISS” document because of lack of knowledge by government employees. 
The study further revealed that there is a lack of security awareness in government 
departments with regard to the protection of security information due to lack of 
support from top management. Generally speaking, security risk control measures 
that are mentioned in the above table are still not enough to protect classified 
information in government departments. A very low percentage of the participants 
indicated signing of an oath of secrecy, installation of encryption devices and 
protection of server room of which this becomes a risk to other government 
departments that do know have knowledge with regard to the mentioned security risk 
control measures. 
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4.6.16 Improvement of security measures (See Annexure A question 41) 
Table 4.41 General improvement of security (N=100) 
In your opinion, what should be done to improve the 
protection of security information in general in your 
departments? 
Frequency Percentage 
Encourage all employees to comply with the MISS policy 
and procedures 
6 6.0 
Encourage support from top management 6 6.0 
Laptops must be encrypted 7 7.0 
Improve security structure by appointing information 
security practitioners 
1 1.0 
Testing of security measures 1 1.0 
Information security must be developed, monitored and 
implementation of MISS document 
7 7.0 
Replace manual assets management system with 
electronic system 
6 6.0 
Information session or awareness to staff on regular 
basis 
10 10.0 
Regular security checks 1 1.0 
Police station should ensure that information is treated 
accordingly and be protected 
1 1.0 
 Access should be denied on high job profile 1 1.0 
Effective security system at all restricted areas 1 1.0 
Security vetting, more vigorous vetting and screening 7 7.0 
More steel cabinets   1 1.0 
SITA and COMSEC to improve IT security and 
communication security system 
1 1.0 
People dealing with classified information should be 
aware and familiar with the classification system and 
filing system 
1 1.0 
Sharing of computers must be stopped 1 1.0 
Implement whistle blowing 1 1.0 
Password must be changed every week or monthly basis 1 1.0 
 Appointment of security managers 1 1.0 
 Training of staff 7 7.0 
 Allocation of resources (Budget and manpower) 1 1.0 
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Effective counter measures to fight fraud and corruption 1 1.0 
Penalties for employees who remove classified 
information without authorisation and those who leave 
classified information on their tables without locking them 
away after work 
1 2.0 
All staff members must sign oath of secrecy 1 1.0 
Install fire walls and antivirus protection 1 1.0 
Search vehicles 1 1.0 
Implement encryption devices on electronic 
communication devices 
1 1.0 
Establish security committee that will address security 
issues especially information security 
2 2.0 
Reporting of irregularities/corruption activities especially 
on information security 
1 1.0 
Security guards must be posted at restricted areas 1 1.0 
Visit by National Security officers (intelligence) yearly 1 1.0 
To make the executive management informed about 
protection of classified information 
1 1.0 
Request funds to procure security measures like 
encryption devices, biometric devices to control access to 
offices 
1 1.0 
Fire alarm system, fire detectors must be installed at 
registry offices 
1 1.0 
Proper access control measures 1 1.0 
Police must work with community to improve their work 
rate 
1 1.0 
Awareness should be escalated to contractors as well 1 1.0 
All personnel must be vetted to the level of top secret 
clearance 
1 1.0 
Classification of documents 1 1.0 
Top management must approve security policy 1 1.0 
Cancel all memory stick on computers 1 1.0 
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There must be an appropriate storage of movable 
devices such as CD, DVD and USB (memory sticks) 
1 1.0 
Security management should be prioritised in 
government department as it plays a vital role 
1 1.0 
Decisive intervention is needed in the legislative and 
framework governing information 
1 1.0 
All those who will fail the vetting process should not be 
allowed to work with confidential information 
1 1.0 
Integrated security control measures must be put in place 1 1.0 
Documents must be locked behind locked doors 1 1.0 
Secure transportation of information in sealed envelopes 1 1.0 
Encourage whistle blowing policy or people to report 
wrong-doing by internal staff  
1 1.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to determine what should be done to improve security risk 
control measures in government departments for the protection of security 
information.  The majority of the participants suggested that information session or 
awareness should be conducted to staff on regular basis. Different opinions were 
raised about what should be done to improve the protection of security information in 
general in government departments. Seven percent (7%) proposed security risk 
control measures such as security vetting, more vigorous vetting and screening, 
laptops must be encrypted, implementation of “MISS” document and training of staff. 
A very low percentage suggested the following  security risk control measures:  
improve security structure by appointing information security practitioners; police 
station should ensure that information is treated accordingly and be protected; 
effective security system at all restricted areas; more steel cabinets, allocation of 
resources (budget and manpower); penalties for employees who remove classified 
information without authorization and those who leave classified information on their 
table without locking them away after work and lastly; request funds to procure 
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security measures like encryption devices, biometric devices to control access to 
office. 
 
Deduction:  
The study indicates clearly that participants are prepared to protect classified 
information by educating employees through information session or awareness and 
training however they receive the necessary support from top management. The 
participants are also eager to comply with the “MISS” document; hence, they 
proposed that employee be encouraged to comply with the “MISS” policy and 
procedures. The study further indicates that only a few percentage of the participants 
mentioned other different security risk control measures that should be implemented 
in government departments for the protection of security information. However, it 
becomes a risk as not all government departments are willing to implement the 
identified security risk control measures indicated on the above table. It appears from 
the study that government departments are not ready to use common information 
security standards for the protection of security information.  
 
4.6.17 Changing of security risk control measures (See Annexure A question 42) 
Table 4.42 Changing of security risk control measures for effectiveness 
(N=100) 
What security risk control measures do you think need 
to be changed in YOUR department to make them more 
effective for the protection of security information? 
Frequency Percent 
The department must consider changing card readers with 
biometrics access control system 
2 2.0 
Restriction to classified information needs to be intensified 
by management 
11 11.0 
Policies and procedures 3 3.0 
Access to the department – all people moving in and out of 
the department must be regulated 
1 1.0 
Access to registry must be through biometrics systems 1 1.0 
Vetting and pre-employment screening must be prioritised 15 15.0 
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to employees who have access to classified information.  
There must be penalties for employees who leave 
classified information on their tables without being locked 
away 
1 1.0 
Uncontrolled photocopying of classified information 1 1.0 
The use of electronic filing system instead of manual 1 1.0 
Employ security staff/personnel who are qualified or who 
have relevant qualification, knowledge and skills 
1 1.0 
Restriction to classified information need to be intensified 
by management 
1 1.0 
Access to buildings and sensitive areas 1 1.0 
Registers used at registry 2 2.0 
Security forum must be held monthly instead of quarterly   2 2.0 
Upgrade security clearance level to top secret clearance 
only 
1 1.0 
Improved on the storage facilities for classified documents 1 1.0 
Install biometric access control system and CCTV to all 
buildings 
4 4.0 
Delivery of submission in security envelopes 2 2.0 
To concentrate on training of personnel with regard to the 
handling and storage of classified documents 
1 1.0 
Using vetted officials from private security companies 
before employing them 
1 1.0 
There should be a permanent employee who irresponsible 
for the protection of information in all SAPS police stations 
who does not work shifts 
1 1.0 
Provide valid security clearance certificate 1 1.0 
Safes containing case files must be locked during the night 
and be opened during the day only 
1 1.0 
Sharing of passwords 3 3.0 
Do not throw away unused documents 1 1.0 
Access control 1 1.0 
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The department must stop employing wrong personnel on 
security posts as they do not have experience 
1 1.0 
No cellular phones or I-pad should be allowed in sensitive 
meetings 
1 1.0 
Security officers must be placed or posted to control 
access to the boardroom where classified information is 
discussed 
1 1.0 
Sweeping of boardrooms where classified or sensitive 
information is going to be discussed 
1 1.0 
Vetting should be done in-house and not by SSA as it takes 
years to obtain feedback 
1 1.0 
Compulsory security training. 1 1.0 
Effective security awareness. 3 3.0 
Effective security committee supported by top management 1 1.0 
Bags with seals need to be checked by security and the 
registers when documents are taken out of department by 
messengers 
1 1.0 
Installation of optimiser instead of wooden drawers 1 1.0 
Privatisation of government security services as it leads to 
corruption 
2 2.0 
All sensitive documents must be classified and be stored 
according to its sensitivity 
1 1.0 
Building keys must be controlled by security only 1 1.0 
Making use of re-enforced steel cabinets 1 1.0 
Free access to all government buildings need to be 
changed 
1 1.0 
Vetting of police officers from confidential to top secret 
clearance 
1 1.0 
A docket must be scanned and kept safe electronically with 
back-up system 
2 2.0 
Computer rooms must be controlled by one responsible 
person in order to safe guard the department information 
1 1.0 
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Department should stop employing people before 
conducting background checks 
3 3.0 
To ensure that registry develop registers for classified 
documents 
2 2.0 
To ensure that only registry personnel with clearance are 
allowed to work in the registry 
1 1.0 
Educate all staff on how to classify sensitive documents 1 1.0 
Provide lockable storage facilities in the department 1 1.0 
Searching should be done by technological equipment and 
not manual 
1 1.0 
Proper use of communication security and encryption 
system 
1 1.0 
Actions to be taken against negligent losses of laptops 
containing sensitive information 
1 1.0 
Only people with necessary security clearance must be 
given access to classified documents 
1 1.0 
Appointment of more security staff 1 1.0 
The use of hand metal detector must be changed to walk-
through metal detector 
1 1.0 
Changing of four or three lever locking system to a cylinder 
locks 
1 1.0 
Attitude by officials towards security must be changed 2 2.0 
Total  100 100.0 
 
Interpretation: 
This question was asked to determine what security risk control measures need to 
be changed in order to make them more effective in government departments for the 
protection of security information.  The majority of the participants indicated that 
vetting and pre-employment screening must be prioritised to employees who have 
access to classified information. The next higher percentage of the participants 
indicated restriction to classified information needs to be intensified by management. 
The table above indicates various security risk control measures which the 
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participants want them to be changed in order to make them more effective for the 
protection of security information: the department must consider changing card 
readers with biometric access control; access to the registry must be done through 
biometric system; uncontrolled photocopying of classified information; the use of 
electronic filing system instead of manual; registers used at the registry; delivery of 
submission in security envelopes; making use of  reinforced steel cabinets and other 
security risk control measures as indicated in the above table.  Participants further 
emphasised that departments should provide lockable storage facilities, proper use 
of communication security and encryption devices, the use of hand metal detector 
must be changed to walk-through metal detector and lastly, changing of four or three 
lever locking system to a cylinder locks.   
 
Deduction: 
The majority  of the participants indicated that vetting and pre-employment screening 
must be prioritised to employees who have access to classified information because 
it is a risk for government departments who employed applicants without the 
application of these security risk control measures. Pre-screening of applicants is of 
paramount importance because it eliminates employees who have illicit activities 
when they apply for employment in government departments especially when it 
comes to handling of classified information. The study shows that there is free 
access to classified information by government employees; hence, the participants 
indicated restriction to classified information needs to be intensified by management. 
There are a number of proposed security risk control measures that need to be 
changed in government departments. As a result, this shows that classified 
information is currently at risk with ineffective security risk control measures 
implemented in government departments. 
 
According to Carrol (1977:104), a contrast exists between vetting as it can be done 
by private firms and government agencies. A private firm is able to inquire into 
personal habits that go to establish reliability, whereas such inquiries are often 
forbidden in government departments.  
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4.7. OBSERVATION. 
Observations (See Annexure B) were conducted by the researcher at various 
government departments. The main target was Registry Offices because it is where 
the flow of information takes place. It was observed that all one hundred percent 
(100%) of government departments have security measures in place for the 
protection of security information. However, there is no uniformity. Most of security 
measures implemented for the protection of security information is vetting of 
personnel. Access to classified information is controlled. However, different security 
measures were used. The most security risk control measures used to control 
access to classified documents were electronic access control systems.  It was 
confirmed during observation that most of the government departments,  (98%) 
indeed have safes, strong rooms,  reinforced steel cabinets for the storage of 
sensitive information. Only two percent (2%) of government departments uses 
wooden filling cabinets. It was discovered that doors or filing systems are fitted with 
security locks and that combination locks are used in most of the departments.  In 
terms of transportation, normal government vehicles are used to transport 
unclassified and classified documents. It was observed that in most instances, 
receipts were signed by the addressee and returned to sender when classified 
documents were delivered. It was also observed that registers for photocopying and 
destruction of classified documents and unclassified documents were used. There 
were few security alarms implemented at the Registry Offices to monitor the 
movement of personnel entering and leaving the area. Most government 
departments have key control policies in place. All officials sign for their office keys. 
 
Interpretation:  
Observation reveals that most government departments have security risk control 
measures for the protection of security information. However, there is no uniformity. 
It was established that different security risk control measures were used in various 
departments for the protection of security information. However, the most one was 
vetting of personnel. 
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Deduction: 
Government departments implement different security risk control measures 
because they fail to comply with the “MISS” document that contains common 
security standards for the protection of security information. 
 
4.8. DOCUMENTARY STUDY 
Documentary study (see Annexure C) was conducted in one hundred (100) 
government departments where one-on-one interviews were conducted with 
participants. During the documentary study, it was discovered that seventy two 
percent (72%) of security policies were in place however thirty percent (30%) of them 
were not approved. All of those security policies cover the protection of security 
information. Eighty percent (80%) of government departments have files for security 
clearance certificates for employees who handle classified documents. The study 
revealed that only fifty nine percent (59%) of government departments have security 
manuals and posters. In addition, seventy three percent (73%) of government 
departments have security registers to record classified documents. Records of 
security meeting such as minutes, attendance registers and agendas were kept in all 
government departments.  Security legislation such as the Protection of Information 
Act has been utilised in most of government departments. All employees’ personal 
files are classified as confidential. Documents containing sensitive information are 
kept in the Registry Offices for control purpose. It was discovered during the 
documentary study that most employees keep other file including classified files in 
their offices instead of sending them to Registry. Seventy one percent (71%) of 
government departments have kept records of confidentiality agreements or oath of 
secrecy. However, it was established during the documentary study that fifty percent 
(50%) of government departments did not classify documents that contains sensitive 
information. 
 
Interpretation: 
Most of employees keep files including classified information in their offices instead 
of keeping them at the Registry Office. Furthermore, most of documents that contain 
sensitive information are not classified according to their level of classifications. 
Deduction: 
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Employees keep classified documents in their offices instead of sending them to 
Registry because they wanted to access information on daily basis without delay or 
following Registry processes. Furthermore, most documents that contain sensitive 
information were not classified according to their level of classification because 
employees do not know how to classify such information. 
 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
The collected information was descriptively analysed. Data from the interviews, 
observation and documentary study data were analysed, interpreted and deductions 
made according to the research objectives. All conclusions drawn from the research 
results will be discussed as findings with recommendations in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This study was conducted because government departments are faced with many 
security breaches that occur regularly whereby laptops and documents containing 
classified or sensitive information are stolen. Furthermore, the leakage of 
information, exploitation and espionage are also great challenges within government 
departments. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the existing security 
measures at government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated 
with the protection of information and to recommend appropriate security risk control 
measures to mitigate the threats. The data collected through interviews, observation 
and documentary study was analysed and interpreted in Chapter 4. The researcher 
managed to achieve the goal and objectives of the study supported with his 
experience in the public sector. This chapter presents the findings and 
recommendations based on the analysis of the collected research data. 
 
5.2. RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
The protection of security information in government departments is governed by the 
“MISS” document. According to “MISS” cabinet document (1998), sensitive or 
classified information must be exempted from disclosure and must enjoy protection 
against compromise (South Africa 1998). 
The “MISS” document sets out the fundamental responsibilities and security 
programmes for Information Security Managers in government departments. It is a 
directive or guideline that outlines the foundation, implementation and effective 
monitoring of security risk control measures in government departments.  It also 
gives the Information Security Managers the authority to take the necessary actions 
in security breaches that relates to the protection of security information on behalf of 
the Head of the Department.  There is an absolute need for effective security risk 
control measures to be implemented in order to counter espionage, the leakage of 
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information, the theft of information, corruption and unauthorised disclosure of 
information. This study was intended to determine if there is compliance with the 
“MISS” document by government departments in South Africa. In order to achieve 
the study objectives, the researcher conducted interviews, observation and 
documentary study.   
  
5.3. FINDINGS 
The biographical information provided by the participants in the study showed that 
the majority of Information Security Managers were males as compared to females. 
It was further established that majority of respondents who participated were 
between 36 – 45 years of age. In terms of highest qualifications obtained, most of 
the participants have postgraduate qualifications. The researcher made the following 
findings and recommendations in accordance with the objectives of the study. 
 
5.3.1 PRIMARY FINDINGS 
5.3.1.1 Poor dispatch of classified documents 
It was found that most of government departments remove and dispatch their 
classified documents by hand, using normal envelopes (non-security envelopes).   
 
5.3.1.2 Lack of surveillance cameras (CCTV) 
It was found that the majority ninety five percent (95%) of government departments 
did not install surveillance cameras because they are not aware that the type of 
security risk control measure could assist them to monitor the movement of 
employees who enter or leave the Registry. 
 
5.3.1.3 Poor control over the destruction of redundant documents containing 
classified information 
It was found that the majority fifty four percent (54%) of government departments did 
not have security risk control measures when the destruction of redundant 
documents containing sensitive information takes place. 
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5.3.1.4 Classified information is communicated through unprotected 
communication equipment  
It was found that the majority sixty two percent (62%) of the government 
departments did not have security risk control measures in place for the protection of 
communication equipment that are used to communicate classified information. 
Observations revealed that most government departments did not install encryption 
devices on communication equipment to protect classified information because of 
insufficient security budget and lack of knowledge with regard to this type of devices.  
 
5.3.1.5 Most of employees have confidential clearance that gives them an 
access to classified information for a long period without being renewed   
It was found that confidential clearance lasts for a period of 20 years without being 
renewed. As a result, this poses a security risk to government information because 
most of employees may use this as an opportunity to commit crime.   
 
5.3.1.1.6 Employees handle classified information without valid security 
clearance or pre-employment screening  
It was found that the employees handle classified information without valid security 
clearance or pre-employment screening. The current security weakness is the 
handling sensitive information without a valid security clearance certificates makes 
security clearance a risk in government departments and it is found to be high. It is 
likely that employees may use the opportunity of not having a valid security 
clearance to do corruption, leak information or steal classified information knowing 
that there is no security risk control measure in place. The impact is found to be 
serious. It is likely that government departments may lose classified information due 
to employees who do not have valid security clearance. Employees may do too 
much corruption knowing that government departments do not have security risk 
control measure that will detect their corrupt activities. It was found that most 
employees are not security vetted or screened during their employment in 
government departments. Nevertheless, they have access to classified information. 
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5.3.1.7 None-compliance of “MISS” document 
It was found that the majority twenty seven percent (27%) of government 
departments do not comply with the “MISS” document with regard to the protection 
of security information. The study revealed that only a few government departments 
adhered to the “MISS” document with regards to the classification of sensitive 
information. It is worrying that the majority of government departments do not have 
knowledge on how to classify documents containing sensitive information.   
 
5.3.1.8 Failure to distinguish between non-sensitive and sensitive information 
It was found that the majority of government departments do not distinguish between 
non-sensitive information and sensitive information. Consequently, they did not have 
any security risk control measures to protect information stored in computers. 
 
5.3.1.9 Unapproved security policy and procedures 
It was found that the majority seventy eight percent (78%) of government 
departments were operating with draft security policies and procedures; hence, their 
security risk control measures for the protection of security information were not 
effective.  
 
5.3.1.10 Poor classification system 
It was found that most documents that contain sensitive information were not 
classified according to their level of classifications because employees do not know 
how to classify such information. The study revealed that sensitive information is not 
classified according to the “MISS” document because of lack of knowledge by most 
of government employees. 
 
5.3.1.11 Lack of security risk control measures for photocopying classified 
documents 
It was found that most of the government departments do not have security risk 
control measures in place when photocopying classified documents. 
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5.3.1.12 Leakage of information 
It was found that the majority fifty eight percent (58%) of employees leak classified 
information due to lack of security risk control measures for the protection of security 
information in government departments. Lack of security risk control measures 
creates an opportunity to employees to leak classified information.  Should the 
information be leaked by an employee, the impact will affect the objectives or 
functions of the department as the leakage might cause harm. The probability 
(likelihood) for leakage of information by staff is found to be high as there are no 
security risk control measures in place to prevent the employees from leaking the 
information. The impact is found to be very serious should classified information be 
leaked out of government departments. In other words, classified information may 
fall under the wrong hands or unauthorised persons who may in return use it for their 
own benefit in order to disrupt the main objectives of government departments. 
 
5.3.1.13 Opportunity to commit theft  
It was found that most the government departments have experienced theft of 
documents containing sensitive information. The study revealed that theft of 
information in government department is high because of lack of sufficient security 
risk control measures. The opportunity to commit theft is very likely in government 
departments due to lack of sufficient security risk control measures. The probability 
(likelihood) to get an opportunity to commit theft by internal staff is found to be high 
due to lack of security risk control measures. Should the employees get an 
opportunity to steal classified information, the impact will be very serious because 
unauthorised persons may cause harm or disrupt the objectives of government 
departments by using the information to discredit government departments.  
. 
5.3.1.14. Lack of network security (firewalls, antivirus, pin codes and spyware) 
It was found that the majority sixty two percent (62%) of government departments do 
not have their computer equipment protected by firewalls, antivirus, pin codes, and 
spyware. The study revealed that most of employees still lack knowledge with regard 
to this type of security risk control measures. 
 
 
116 
 
116 
 
 
5.3.1.15. Lack of security awareness 
It was found that there is a lack of security awareness in government departments 
with regard to the protection of security information due to lack of support from top 
management.  
 
5.3.2. SECONDARY FINDINGS 
5.3.2.1. Lack of training  
It was found that most of the government departments do not have knowledge on 
how to classify documents containing sensitive information. The study revealed that 
there is lack of training with regard to the classification of documents that contain 
sensitive information. Nonetheless, most government departments did not install 
surveillance cameras because they are not aware that this type of security risk 
control measure could assist them to monitor the movement of staff who enter or 
leave the Registry. This is because of a lack of training from government 
departments. 
 
5.3.2.2. Poor management 
It was found that the majority twenty seven percent (27%) of government 
departments do not comply with security directives such as “MISS”, “MPSS” and 
security measures due to lack of support from top management. It was further found 
that most of the government departments do not have restriction to classified 
information as this need to be intensified by management.  
 
5.3.2.3. Insufficient security budget 
It was found that the major risk that contributes to ineffectiveness of security risk 
control measures in government departments is insufficient fund or security budget. 
Most of security risk control measures such as electronic devices were not installed 
in government departments to control access to classified documents because of 
cost.  
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5.4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is suggested that the following recommendations be implemented in government 
departments for the protection of security information in South Africa: 
 
5.4.1 Poor dispatch of classified documents 
Government departments should ensure that the following security risk control 
measures are implemented when classified documents are dispatched from 
premises: sealed security envelopes; steel containers with high security locks, 
signing of outgoing classified register; appropriate transportation services such as 
courier services; removal permit and dispatch must be done by trustworthy persons 
(employees who have valid security clearance certificates). 
 
5.4.2 Lack of surveillance cameras  
Government departments should ensure that surveillance cameras are installed in 
order to monitor the movement of people who enter or leave the Registry. 
 
5.4.3 Poor control over the destruction of redundant document containing 
classified information 
Appropriate security risk control measures such as a shredding machine, burning 
and approval from the National Archives must be implemented by government 
departments in order to control the destruction of redundant documents containing 
classified information. 
 
5.4.4 Classified information is communicated through unprotected 
communication equipment 
All communication equipment such as fax machines, laptops, computers, radio 
systems and telephone networks that are used to transmit or convey sensitive 
information to be encrypted by encryption devices for the protection of security 
information. These units offer an extremely high degree of security. Furthermore, 
government departments must ensure that when dealing with protected disclosures 
and in order to ensure confidentiality, the telephone line (which is also used as a 
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confidential fax) must be separated from the switchboard. E-mails must also be 
monitored by the Information Technology (IT) Unit. 
 
5.4.5 Most employees have confidential clearance that gives them access to 
classified information for a long period without being renewed 
Vetting of employees should be upgraded to the level of top secret as confidential 
clearance last for a long period and employees may be involved in illicit activities 
without being detected.  
 
5.4.6 Employees handle classified information without valid security clearance 
or pre–employment screening 
Government departments should ensure that pre-employment screening is 
conducted to all applicants before employment or during appointment process. Pre-
employment screening should be carried out to prevent hiring unethical people who 
may disclose confidential information. Security vetting and pre-employment 
screenings are the most important processes to ensure the protection of security 
information. Security vetting and pre-employment screening can be regarded as the 
first line of defence that government departments have to protect its information. Pre-
employment screening is required when a person is first employed, promoted, 
transferred or performs general official duties in a post that will give him or her 
access to classified information. Most importantly, this security risk control measure 
is necessary because people change over time. Implementation of security vetting 
by government departments will assist government departments from employing 
employees who are untrustworthy. It is further recommended that all personnel who 
have access to classified documents be vetted to the level of top secret clearance in 
order to strengthen the protection of security information in government departments. 
Security clearance certificate should be used as a key to access classified 
information. Moreover, employees who do not have valid security clearance 
certificates should be denied access to classified information. Security vetting and 
pre-employment screening must be prioritised to employees who have access to 
classified information as this did not happen in most of government departments.  
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5.4.7 None-compliance to “MISS” document  
Decisive intervention is urgently needed in the legislative and regulatory      
framework governing the protection of security information. It is recommended that 
administrative document such as the “MISS” be complied with by all Information 
Security Managers in order to have effective protection of security information in 
government departments. Subsequent to this, departmental security policies must be 
developed in line with the “MISS” so that there are common standards on the 
protection of security information applied in all government departments. In addition, 
Information Security Managers should ensure that they play a vital role in 
developing, implementing or enforcing and monitoring of information security policies 
so that they become more familiar with the security policies and procedures. 
 
5.4.8 Failure to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive information 
Government departments should ensure that they implement appropriate security 
risk control measures such as computer passwords and encryption devices to 
protect information stored in computers. Furthermore, government departments 
should intensify training of employees on the protection of security information that 
will enable employees to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive 
information. 
 
5.4.9 Unapproved security policy and procedures 
All government departments should ensure that they develop clear security policies 
and procedures that cover the protection of security information. Security policies 
and procedures must be approved as these are the cornerstones of the institution. 
There should be a clear directive that lay down procedures with regard to the 
handling of information that requires protection against leakage or disclosure of 
classified information. Most importantly, top management should support Information 
Security Managers to enforce security policies and procedures especially on the 
protection of security information. Information Security Managers should ensure that 
they familiarise themselves with the security policy and procedures as these are the 
cornerstones of the department. 
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5.4.10 Poor classification system 
Documents containing sensitive information should be classified according to its 
degree of sensitivity. Each document should be identified with a marking indicating 
its classification level (rubber-stamped Confidential, Secret or Top Secret in red ink). 
By using an information classification system, inappropriate disclosure is likely to 
occur, and the protection of security information becomes effective for the 
department.  
 
5.4.11 Lack of security risk control measures for photocopying classified 
documents 
Government departments should ensure that a photocopying register is implemented 
when photocopying classified documents. The photocopy machine must be 
encrypted with encryption devices. 
 
5.4.12 Leakage of information (Oath of secrecy or confidentiality agreements) 
Government departments should ensure that employees who have access to 
classified information sign oath of secrecy forms or confidentiality agreements in 
order to protect them from leaking classified information. 
 
5.4.13 Opportunity to commit theft 
Government departments should ensure that they implement appropriate security 
risk control measures for the protection of security information in order to prevent 
employees’ opportunity to commit theft. If appropriate, security risk control measures 
for the protection of security information could be effectively implemented, the rate of 
opportunity for employees to steal classified information will be low. 
 
5.4.14 Lack of network security (firewalls, antivirus, passwords, pin codes and 
spyware) 
Firewalls and antivirus should be installed in computers to protect electronic data. 
Computer users should use passwords to protect unauthorised access to their 
computers. Passwords should be changed on a monthly basis in order to limit 
unauthorised access to sensitive information stored in their computers.  
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5.4.15 Lack of security awareness 
Regular information security awareness must be contacted to make employee 
security conscious. It is important for every organisation, especially government 
departments, to ensure that employees who handle classified information receive 
security awareness.  
 
5.4.16 Lack of training 
Government departments should put more emphasis on training to ensure that they 
train their employees on how to protect sensitive information. If all employees should 
acquire an appropriate skills and knowledge on how to protect sensitive information, 
the risks associated with the protection of security information will be mitigated. 
 
5.4.17 Poor management 
Top management should support Information Security Managers in complying with 
security directives such as “MISS”, “MPSS” and security risk control measures for 
the protection of security information.  
 
5.4.18 Insufficient security budget 
Government departments should ensure that they increase their security budget so 
that Information Security Managers could be able to purchase or install security risk 
control measures such as electronic devices that will assist security officials to 
control access to registries where classified information is stored. 
 
5.5.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It is recommended that further studies be conducted on the relevancy of the “MISS” 
document and its implementation.  This study only focused on the security aspects of 
the “MISS” document and not the relevance of it. Since the “MISS” document was 
approved by the government of the Republic of South Africa, its relevance was not 
researched, hence, the recommendations for further research. This kind of study 
could establish more security standards relevant to the “MISS”, which could be used 
to better the protection of security information in government departments. 
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5.6. CONCLUSION 
Government departments have valuable information that needs to be protected. 
Thus, it is the responsibility of every government employee including top 
management to ensure that Security Risk Control Measures are applied in full for the 
protection of security information. The study revealed that the protection of security 
information in government departments is not being implemented in full to reduce 
loss, destruction, alteration and leakage of information. Specific reference was made 
to the “MISS” document that was approved on December 4, 1998 by the South 
African Government as a national information security policy to be adhered to. These 
standards must be considered by government departments to ensure proper 
handling of sensitive or classified information to protect it against loss or destruction. 
The recommendations discussed in this chapter will assist government departments 
for the protection of security information. 
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure A: Interview schedule 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Please answer all of the following questions as honestly as possible. The information 
collected during this study will be used to help the researcher to come up with 
constructive solutions for the lack of security measures with regard to protection of 
security information by government departments. You do not need to identify 
yourself and the researcher undertakes to maintain anonymity in that there is no 
possibility of being identified or linked in any way with the research findings in the 
final research report. Where required please indicate your answer with a cross (X) in 
the appropriate box. 
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only: 
1. Gender 
Male  
Female  
 
2. Age range 
15-25  
26-35  
36-45  
46- and above  
 
3. The highest educational level attained: 
None   
Grade 1 up to grade  7  
High School   
Undergraduate  
Postgraduate  
 
4. Employment category: 
Clerical   
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Administration   
Junior Management   
Middle Management  
Top Management  
  
5. Name of your institution or / department: 
State security  
Correctional services  
Home Affairs  
Police  
Defence and military veterans  
Justice and Constitutional Development  
Other (please specify):  
 
SECTION B: SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
6. What type of security risk control measures are in existence for the protection 
of security information in Government Departments? 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
7. Do you find the security risk control measures at your department to be 
effective? 
Yes    No  
 
8. If no, please say why you find these measures to be not effective. 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
Indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
9. Leakage of information at Government department can be reduced if proper 
security risk control measures can be implemented effectively by Security 
Managers (SM) 
Strongly agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
10. Do you have security policies and procedures in place at your department 
pertaining to protection of security information? 
Yes   No  
130 
 
130 
 
 
 
11. If ‘yes’ how familiar are you with these security policies and procedures that 
are in place? 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
12. How access to the registry is controlled in your department? 
............................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................... 
13. How do you exercise control over outgoing and incoming classified 
documents? 
Outgoing registers Yes  No  
Incoming registers Yes  No  
Outgoing classified registers Yes  No  
Incoming classified registers  Yes  No  
None of the above Yes  No  
Any other/specify............................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................ 
14. How are classified documents removed or dispatched from the premises? 
(E.g. securing transportation methods, records keeping and authorization). 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
15. What security programmes are in place to make the staff security conscious 
with regard to protection of security information?  
.................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
SECTION C: SECURITY RISKS IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
16. What security risks are associated with the protection of security information 
in Government Departments? 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
17. Did you ever experience theft of information in your department? 
Yes   No  
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18. If ‘yes’ please indicate below how this information was stolen in your 
department. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Theft of computers and laptops from offices      
Theft of laptops from official’s own vehicles      
Missing files from registry      
Burglary in offices      
Corruption by internal employees      
Interception from computers/ computer hacking      
 
19. Did you report any of these experienced crime/ theft of information? 
Yes   No  
 
20. If ‘yes’, to whom did you report these crime/theft of information? 
Police  State Security 
Agency 
 Head of 
Department 
 Manager/supervisor   
 
21. Was any action taken after this incident or theft of information was reported? 
Yes   No  
 
22. If ‘yes’, please specify what was done: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
23. Do all personnel handling sensitive information in your department have a 
valid security clearance certificates? 
Yes   No  
 
24. If ‘yes’ please indicate the level of the security clearance they have. 
Top secret  Secret  Confidential  
 
25. How all employees or sections within the department are receiving their mail 
and official files? (Do they sign for it, is there a checklist for the mail and etc). 
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Signing mail register  Security 
envelopes 
 Hand 
delivered 
 Non- security 
envelopes/ files 
 
 
26. Are there security risk control measures in place when photocopying   
classified documents?  
Yes   No  
 
27. If ‘yes’ please specify: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
28. Are there security risk control measures when the destruction of redundant 
documents containing sensitive information is done? 
Yes   No  
 
29. If ‘yes” please specify the type of security risk control measures: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
30. Are communication equipment protected for interception in your department? 
Yes   No  
 
31. If ‘yes’ please explain how is it protected: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
32. Are there safes, strong rooms or re-enforced steel cabinets for the storage of 
classified documents in your department? 
Yes   No  
 
33. If ‘no’ please indicate how are classified documents stored in your 
department: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
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34. Is access to computer/saver/network room controlled? 
Yes   No  
 
35. If ‘yes” please specify how it is controlled: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
36. Do computer users protect information stored in their computers? 
Yes   No  
 
37. If ‘yes’ please specify how computer users protect information stored in their 
computers: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
38. Have you ever been approached by outside people requesting you to provide 
government information in exchange of money or anything? 
Yes   No  
 
39. If ‘yes’ please explain: 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
SECTION D: SOLUTIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION 
IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
40. Which type of security risk control measures may be put in place for the 
protection of security information in Government Departments? 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
41. In your opinion, what should be done to improve the protection of security 
information in general in your department? 
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
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............................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................... 
42. What security risk control measures do you think need to be changed in 
YOUR department to make them more effective for the protection of security 
information?........................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................ 
For office use: 
 
Questionnaire number:........................................ 
Researcher’s Signature:........................................ 
Date of interview:................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
135 
 
 
ANNEXURE B: OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 
OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 
Security measures surveyed:  Government departments  
Survey date 
 Yes  No  Comments  
1. Are there approved security policy document for the 
protection of security information? 
   
2. Are doors at registry office in which classified documents 
are kept fitted with security locks? 
   
3. Are there course materials, security manuals and posters in 
place? 
   
4. Are there registers for incoming and outgoing classified 
documents? 
   
5. Are there security legislations applicable for the protection of 
security information? 
   
6. Are classified documents that are not in use stored in the 
appropriate safe storage facilities such as normal filing cabinet, 
reinforced filing cabinet, safes or walk in safes and strong 
room?  
   
7. Are there physical protection systems such as access 
control to registries, safes, strong rooms, reinforced filing 
cabinets and visitor’s cards in place? 
   
8. Are there effective access control to restricted areas such 
as cryptographic, server room and computer centres? 
   
9. Are there proper control over movement of classified 
information in the registry office? 
   
10. Are documents containing sensitive information classified 
according to their level of classification? 
   
11. Does the department uses secure transportation when 
transporting classified documents? 
   
12. Are receipts signed by the addressee and returned to    
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sender when classified documents were delivered? 
13. Are there registers for photocopying of classified 
documents? 
   
14. Are there registers for the destruction of classified 
documents? 
   
15. Do employees sign for their office keys?    
16. Are there security alarm s implemented at Registry Office?    
17. Are there records kept for security meetings?    
18. Are personal files of every employee classified?    
19. Are records kept for all departmental files that contain 
sensitive information? 
   
20. Are there records kept for confidentiality agreements or 
oath of secrecy? 
   
Subtotal     
A: Total “yes” answers:    
B: Total “no” answers:    
Security backlog (weakness)    
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ANNEXURE C: DOCUMENTARY CHECKLIST 
 
DOCUMENTARY CHECKLIST 
Security measures surveyed:  Government departments  
Survey date 
 Yes  No  Comments  
Do you have security policy?    
Is this security policy implemented effectively?    
Is the security policy renewed annually?    
Does your security policy cover the protection of 
security information? 
   
Do you have security manuals or posters?    
Are there security procedures in place?    
Do you have security plan?    
Is the security plan implemented effectively?    
Do you have access to internet?    
Do you have course materials for the courses that you 
attended? 
   
Are there applicable security legislations?    
Do you keep records or minutes of security meetings?     
Does every employee have personal file?    
Do you keep records of all departmental files that 
contain sensitive information? 
   
Do you keep records of government publications?    
Do you keep records of conference papers?    
Do you keep records of security reports?    
Subtotal     
A: Total “yes” answers:    
B: Total “no” answers:    
Security backlog (weakness)    
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Annexure D1 to D14: Permission letters to conduct interviews in government 
departments. 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
Director: Domestic Branch SSA 
Mr S J Ntombela 
State Security Agency 
Musanda 
Private bag x 87 
Protoria 
0001 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
The Head of department  
MS D Seketane  
Department of Health  
11Masanatrust  
BUSHBACHRIDGE  
1285 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
The Head of department  
Mr Abe Abraham  
Department of Water Affairs  
28 Central road  
Northen Cape  
Kimberley  
8300 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
Captain Masebe  
South African Police Service  
GERMISTON  
69 Railway Road  
GERMISTON  
1400 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
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the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
The Head of Department  
Mr Victor Constable  
Department of Rural Development  
4 Henshel Street  
Medicine building  
NELSPRUIT  
1300 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
The Head of Department  
Mr Bongani Gxilishe  
Department of Economic Development,  
Environmental Affairs and Tourism  
Cnr Beacon Hill and Hargreaves Road  
Hockley close  
KING WILLIAMS TOWN  
5600 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
The Head of Department  
Mr Ceba Mthoba  
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  
Fortrust Building  
Martin Hammerschlag Way  
Roggebay  
CAPE TOWN 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
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the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
Brigadier N. Ramaila  
South African Police Service  
POTCHEFSTROOM  
7&8 Du Bros Building  
Crn Sol Plaatjie and James Moroka  
POTCHEFSTROOM  
3521 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
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the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
The manager  
Mr Z Lekola  
Frestate Department of Health  
P.O.Box 227  
Bloemfontein  
9300 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
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An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
The Cluster Commander  
Major General: MCcRacken  
South African Police Service  
PORT NOLOTH  
Northern Cape  
8300 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
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the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
Station commander  
South African Police Service  
CYFERSKUIL  
RADIUM  
0783 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
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An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
160 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
Advocate Winnie Sonti  
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development  
72 Bok Street  
POLOKWANE  
0700 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
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An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
Commissioner T B Seruwe  
Department of Labour  
94 W F Nkomo Street  
PRETORIA  
0001 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
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An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
SECURITY SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
UNISA 
Tel: (+27) (0)12-433 2164 
Fax: (+27) (0)12- 4296609 6641 
e-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
 
Preller Street, Muckleneuk Ridge 
City of Tshwane 
PO Box 392  
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
          10 May 2014 
 
 
The Head of department  
Mr S Mokoko  
Northern Cape Provincial Treasury  
Cnr Stead & Knight Street  
Private bag x 5054  
KIMBERLY  
8300 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: STUDENT: MJ NKWANA: 
TITLE OF DISSERTATION: PROTECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with 
the protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control 
measures may be recommended to mitigate the risks. 
An empirical study will be conducted by the researcher to collect information 
with regards to the above mentioned study. Permission is requested for Mr 
Nkwana to conduct one – one interviews, observation and documentary study 
at your premises together with your employees. 
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as 
confidential.  
Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr Nkwana’s supervisor, Prof D Govender: 012 4339482: e-
mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za , at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Herewith, please find ethical clearance certificate issued by UNISA to conduct 
this research. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 
8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
Doraval Govender (Dr) 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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Annexure E: Informed consent letter to conduct interviews. 
CONSENT FORM 
  
AGREEMENT: 
I hereby consent to: 
 Yes No  
43. Being interviewed on the following topic: Protection of security  
information within Government Departments in South Africa 
  
44. To give honest answers to reasonable questions and not to mislead 
the interviewer/ researcher; 
  
45. The interview being tape recorded to ensure that valuable 
information elicited during the interview is adequately captured and 
the context of information can be reviewed in details. 
  
I also understand that: 
46. This is a voluntary participation; 
47. I may withdraw from participation at any time should I want to do so; 
48. My opinion will be viewed as strictly confidential.  Anonymity is guaranteed 
and no data published in dissertations and journals will contain any 
information through which my name as an interviewee may be identified; 
49. No reimbursement or gift will be received from the researcher in respect of 
information rendered; 
50. I indemnify the researcher /interviewer against any liability that I may incur 
during the course of the research project; 
51. I have received a signed copy of this consent form; 
I hereby acknowledge that the researcher: 
52. Explained and discussed in details the main aims and objectives of the 
research project with me; 
I am fully aware of: 
53. the serious consequences that may follow any breach or contravention of this 
consent; 
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In co-signing this agreement the researcher undertakes to: 
54. maintain confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy regarding the identity of the 
interviewee and information rendered by him/her. 
 
Signature of participant (interviewee): …………………………. 
Signed at …………………on……………………... 
Signature of researcher (interviewer): …………………………. 
Signed at …………………on……………………... 
I certify that the interviewee has acknowledged that he/she understands the contents of 
this consent which was signed before me and that content of this document was 
explained and discussed with the interviewee:(interviewer signature):……………………. 
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Annexure F: Permission letter to conduct the study 
 
 
COVER LETTER  
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND   Preller Street  
SECURITY SCIENCE      Muckleneuk Ridge 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE    PRETORIA 
COLLEGE OF LAW       P.O. Box 392 
UNISA        UNISA 
Te: +27 12 429 2164        0003 
Fax: +27 12 429 6609                South Africa 
E-mail: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
___________________________________________________________________ 
          08/05/2014 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
Dear Sir/Madam 
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT: PROTECTION OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Mr Mokata Johannes Nkwana is currently a registered student busy with his 
research studies for master’s degree (M Tech) at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) in the Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal 
Justice, College of Law. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existing security measures at 
government departments in South Africa, to identify the risks associated with the 
protection of information, so that appropriate security risk control measures may be 
recommended to mitigate the threats. 
An interview schedule will be used by the researcher to collect information on the 
above objectives with regard to the above mentioned research topic. Your 
department’s participation in this study will help the researcher with his study. We 
therefore request permission for Mr Nkwana to conduct semi-structured interviews, 
observation and documentary study at you premises together with your employees.  
Kindly be informed that responses from participants will be treated as confidential. 
Respondents/ participants are not required to identify themselves in the 
questionnaire. 
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Should there be any enquiries about this research project, please do not hesitate to 
contact Mr Nkwana’s research supervisor, Prof D Govender (012 4339482), or Prof 
A dev Minnaar (012 4339530) at the Department of Criminology and Security 
Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law, UNISA, South Africa. 
Mr Nkwana’s contact details are as follows: Tel: 012 337 1141; Cell: 071 380 8563 
Thanking you for your cooperation. 
 
Regards 
 
 
____________________ 
(Prof) Doraval Govender 
Associate Professor: Programme Security Management 
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Annexure G: Ethical Clearance Certificate 
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Annexure H: Editing Certificate 
 
